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Abstract
Through modern technology we can use the void pore space of
underground rock formations for a growing number of socially beneficial
purposes. These run the gamut from unconventional oil and gas
production to climate change mitigation. The common law of property and
tort, however, has struggled to keep up with advancing technology in this
area. Significant questions remain about the nature of property rights in
pore space. Of particular interest are the limits, if any, on an owner’s right
to use pore space for beneficial purposes when it extends beneath the land
of another. For example, may A hydraulically fracture an oil well on her
property if the fractures extend beneath B’s land? May C store
anthropogenic carbon dioxide for climate change mitigation in a common
reservoir that extends beneath the land of D, E, F, and G if they do not
consent? If so, what, if any, compensation does C owe to the others? These
and similar scenarios pose urgent questions for a wide range of
landowners, industries, environmental interests, courts, and policymakers
across the nation.
This Article searches for answers to these pressing questions in the
doctrinal histories of similar common pool natural resources. The Article
reviews the development of common law rights in water and oil and gas to
synthesize lessons for shaping the content and limits of rights in pore
space. Then, applying these lessons to the current state of pore space
rights, the Article explains that rights in pore space are established by a
default rule of prior use and are absolute, subject to little, if any,
limitation. As demand for the resource continues to grow, however,
owners, and, ultimately, courts will likely search for ways to limit the
absolute extent of pore space rights to avoid a tragedy of the pore space
commons.
In searching for doctrinal mechanisms to make pore space rights
limited, or correlative, the Article predicts that courts will be tempted to
choose between establishing limits by strict, formalist rules of
proportionality (which favor certainty), on the one hand, and
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instrumentalist, utilitarian standards of reasonable use (which favor
development of the resource), on the other. This Article identifies an
underexplored doctrine from oil and gas law that would define the limits
of pore space rights without resort to purely instrumentalist or formalist
doctrines. The “fair-opportunity doctrine” articulated here would permit
an owner to use any quantity of pore space anywhere in a common
reservoir, so long as it does not interfere with the lawful existing
operations of other owners or deprive other owners of a fair opportunity
to either participate in the proposed operations or conduct like operations
from their respective land.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Earth’s subsurface is comprised in large part of geologic reservoirs—
porous and permeable interconnected rock structures—that stretch beyond the
boundaries of any single tract of land.1 By virtue of their porosity, common
reservoirs can contain a number of natural resources like water or hydrocarbons.
Properly considered, the pore space—the rock’s capacity to store fluids—is itself a
useful natural resource for its ability to receive and hold diverse substances, ranging
from hazardous wastes and anthropogenic carbon dioxide to potential energy
generated by renewable sources.2 In addition to storage and disposal of fluids, pore
space is used in the production of hydrocarbons by conventional and unconventional
means, including enhanced recovery, horizontal drilling, and hydraulic fracturing.
Use of pore space for these and various other purposes is largely unregulated,
leaving the task of governing competing uses of interconnected pore space to
common law doctrines of property and tort.3
As technology enables more, and more intensive, use of subsurface pore space,
the task of developing our doctrines governing ownership and use of pore space
grows more urgent. The amount of pore space available for existing and future
commercial and environmental purposes will grow scarcer over time. In fact, pore
space is already beginning to appear scarce in states experiencing high levels of oil
and gas development. In these states, fights over use of pore space, and efforts to
limit injection of oil and gas wastes to avoid environmental externalities like induced
earthquakes, are increasingly common.4 The urgency to define property rights in the
subsurface is further compounded by pressing desires to use pore space to mitigate
greenhouse gas emissions. Though climate mitigation techniques like carbon
1

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A. It has been said that the pore space might be considered a
“renewable” resource in the sense that it can be filled, emptied, and refilled over time for
various purposes. Tara K. Righetti, Correlative Rights and Limited Common Property in the
Pore Space: A Response to the Challenge of Trespass in Carbon Capture and Sequestration,
47 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS. 10420, 10428 (2017).
3
See infra Part II.D.
4
See infra Part V.A.2.
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dioxide capture and storage are potentially economically viable, the lack of clarity
regarding subsurface property rights has helped stymie large-scale implementation.5
Clear answers to the legal questions surrounding ownership and use of pore
space is urgently needed. These legal questions have two dimensions. The first
dimension asks which party holds the initial entitlement to pore space under any
given parcel of real property as between the owner of the surface estate and the
owner of a severed mineral estate. The first dimension—who holds the bundle of
sticks in the pore space—has been addressed elsewhere6 and is settled in several
states, with the majority placing the initial entitlement in the owner of the surface
estate.7
This Article addresses the second dimension of pore space property, which asks
about the extent of the initial entitlement to possess and use the pore space. This
dimension is concerned with the rights and duties included in the pore space bundle
of sticks. Here, the legal doctrine and theory remain underdeveloped. I have argued
elsewhere that the property interest in subsurface reservoirs is a nonpossessory use
right, the extent of which is defined under common law nuisance doctrine.8 Other
writers have characterized the pore space as a form of semicommon property, and
have proposed defining the limits of the property interest either based on utilitarian
standards,9 or strictly in proportion to the size of each owner’s land holdings in the
common reservoir.10
Legal reasoning, and thus the law, often proceeds by analogy. This was true in
the development of oil and gas law, in which early courts sought to analogize oil and
gas to other, better understood natural resources like water and wild animals.11
5

Joseph A. Schremmer, Getting Past Possession: Subsurface Property Disputes as
Nuisances, 95 WASH. L. REV. 315, 323–24 (2020).
6
See generally Owen L. Anderson, Geologic CO2 Sequestration: Who Owns the Pore
Space?, 9 WYO. L. REV. 97 (2009).
7
See Righetti, supra note 2, at 10426–27 (surveying how courts and legislatures have
allocated pore space rights to the surface or severed mineral estate). The Texas Supreme
Court in Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC upheld the trial court’s assertion
in 2017 that the subsurface pore space and all non-mineral structures underground are the
property of the surface estate owner, and that the mineral owner owns only a “fair chance”
to produce any minerals that may exist within the subsurface pore space and structures.
Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 520 S.W. 3d 39, 46–48 (Tex. 2017).
8
Schremmer, supra note 5, at 315–20.
9
See infra Part III.D.2.(b)(i)–(iii) (discussing the theories of reservoir rights of
Professors Eugene Kuntz, David Pierce, and Owen Anderson).
10
See infra Part III.D.2.(a) (discussing the strict-proportional theory of reservoir rights
of Professor Summers) and Part V.C.2 (discussing Professor Righetti’s application of a strictproportional theory to use of pore space for carbon storage).
11
For example, in an 1897 case involving a dispute over the defendant’s right to use
enhanced stimulation techniques—in this case “shooting” a natural gas well with
nitroglycerin—to produce a common reservoir, the Indiana Supreme Court analogized
natural gas to both water and wild animals (or ferae naturae). People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31
N.E. 59, 60 (Ind. 1897). While the animal and water analogies have received significant
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Likewise, in fashioning a set of common law doctrines to govern property rights in
pore space, jurists should consider analogies to other forms of common pool natural
resources. The goal of this Article is to do just that—draw lessons from the
development of the law governing ownership and use of similar natural resources
and apply those lessons to the nascent development of the law of pore space property
rights. Specifically, this Article attempts to construct a doctrine of pore space
property rights based on principles that emerged in the development of other
common pool natural resources: surface waters, groundwater, and oil and gas.
The “fair-opportunity doctrine” ultimately articulated here defines pore space
rights based on certain aspects of these principles without relying on either utilitarian
considerations or a strict rule of proportionality. Under the fair-opportunity doctrine,
any owner of pore space rights in a common reservoir may use any amount of pore
space located anywhere within the reservoir, provided that it does not interfere with
existing pore space activities, or deprive other owners a fair opportunity to either
conduct like uses of the reservoir or participate in the interfering use. For example,
if A wishes to use the pore space capacity of a common reservoir, which also
underlies B’s land, for a carbon dioxide storage facility without B’s consent, A may
do so under the doctrine, provided that the operations do not (1) interfere with B’s
existing use of the reservoir without compensating B, or (2) deprive B of the fair
opportunity to (a) use the reservoir for similar purposes or (b) participate in A’s
operations on fair terms.
It will aid the later discussion to address the analogy I am drawing between
pore space and water and oil and gas resources, because the similarities may not be
obvious at first blush. Water and oil and gas are extracted from pore space, whereas
the pore space itself serves as a conduit or storage tank for receiving injected
substances. Pore space, unlike water and hydrocarbons, is fixed in place and cannot
itself transgress property boundaries. These differences are overwhelmed, however,
by the similarities.12 Like water and oil and gas, pore space is a finite, depleting, and
rivalrous resource. One owner’s use of a cubic inch of common pore space
diminishes the unused pore space available to other common owners by one cubic
inch, just as extraction of a cubic foot of natural gas from a reservoir diminishes the
gas available to other owners in the reservoir by one cubic foot. Moreover, pore
space is interconnected, and it is impossible to perfectly exclude a part of the pore
space in a reservoir from the effects of activities conducted in other parts. The effects
of using pore space under one tract of land thus tend to spill over into pore space
under adjoining tracts. This, too, is similar to common pools of water and oil and
gas, in which extraction from one part of the pool necessarily “spills over” and drains
other parts.
This Article proceeds by identifying pore space as a common pool resource
analogous to water and hydrocarbons. It then surveys the development of rights in
criticism for decades, they are defensible in principle. For a thorough defense, see generally
Rance L. Croft, Of Reservoir Hogs and Pelt Fiction: Defending the Ferae Naturae Analogy
Between Petroleum and Wildlife, 44 EMORY L. J. 697 (1995).
12
The similarities are further addressed infra in Parts I.A–C.
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those resources to synthesize lessons about the development of rights in common
property in general. The Article ultimately applies those lessons to articulate a fairopportunity doctrine of pore space property.
Part II begins by describing the physical characteristics of pore space in
common, interconnected subsurface reservoirs. Based on these physical
characteristics, Part II identifies pore space as a common pool resource and a form
of limited-common, or semicommon, property (like water and oil and gas). Like all
common pool resources, when unregulated, pore space is susceptible to
overexploitation by common owners who can externalize the costs of their overuse
to their fellow common owners—a recipe for a classic tragedy of the commons.13
Part II demonstrates that statutory conservation schemes aimed at conserving certain
resources like oil and gas from wasteful overproduction generally do not cover the
use of pore space itself. This statutory void leaves pore space unregulated except by
an undeveloped body of common law.
Part III considers three models of common law regulation of semicommon
property: riparian waters, groundwater, and oil and gas. The discussion sketches the
development and evolution of rights in these resources over time, focusing on
doctrinal changes as well as changes in the physical and economic conditions of the
resource. The discussion highlights similarities across all three models, which are
explored further in Part IV.
Part IV synthesizes key lessons from the three models. The first lesson is that
rights in semicommon resources shift from absolute to relative in response to shifts
in the resource’s physical and economic conditions over time. These shifts occur in
roughly three stages. In the first stage, rights in the resource are generally based on
an absolute rule that either forbids any disturbance of the resource or permits any
use of the resource regardless of resulting disturbance. In riparian rights, this stage
was reflected in the doctrines of natural flow and ancient use.14 In groundwater and
oil and gas rights, it took shape in the rule of capture.15
As demand for the resource grows, however, the absolute rule tends to cause
either over- or under-exploitation of the resource, and the attendant problems of
waste and high transaction costs eventually overwhelm the absolute rule’s
efficiencies. This leads to a second stage of development, in which rights come to
be viewed as limited by reciprocal duties of reasonable or proportional use, and,
therefore, as relative (or “correlative”) rights in the Langdellian classification.16 The
doctrinal mechanism for relativizing rights is usually furnished by a rule of
13

See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(coining the phrase for the concept of overexploitation of a commons by commoners
unconstrained by rules or norms of governance).
14
See infra Part III.B.1.
15
For groundwater, see Part III.C.1, and for oil and gas, see Part III.D.1.
16
In Professor Christopher Columbus Langdell’s well-known classification, legal
rights are either “absolute” or “relative.” Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal
Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1118 (1986).
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reasonable use or correlative rights, both of which loosely enable informal group
control over the resource.
However, when resource scarcity becomes extreme, and especially when the
resource is nonrenewable and depletable, rights tend to again take an absolute form.
In this third stage of development, rights, while absolute, are more limited in scope
than in the first stage. This third stage occurred in Western water law with adoption
of the prior appropriation doctrine, and in oil and gas law with the passage of
statutory conservation regimes. Yet, in both cases, courts and legislatures again
chipped away at the absolutism of rights in times of severe permanent depletion of
the resource.17 Thus, as detailed in Part III, rights in semicommon resources move
in an accordion-like fashion from absolute to relative in response to resource
conditions.
The second lesson from the models is that the move to relative rights is
accomplished through the application of tort law, specifically nuisance doctrine.
Rights in resources are most often relativized by application of rules of reasonable
use or correlative rights. Like nuisance doctrine, such rules define the limits of the
right to use commonly owned property. Nuisance thus emerges as the tort for
protecting relative property rights. The content of nuisance doctrine, and therefore
of relative rights, depends on philosophical choices about how to define property
rights. This choice is the subject of the third lesson from the semicommon property
models.
The third lesson examines the alternative theoretical bases for defining the
extent of limited property rights. An instrumentalist theory of property rights
balances the utilities of owners’ clashing uses of the resource through a standard of
reasonableness in an effort to achieve maximal efficiency in each case. A formalist
theory, on the other hand, fashions a formal definition of relative rights ex ante,
usually based on strict proportionality, which is applied with minimum reference to
utilitarian considerations. The discussion of the third lesson examines the tradeoff
between maximizing development of the resource in each individual case under an
instrumentalist model and promoting certainty in property under a formalist model.
Part V applies the lessons synthesized in Part IV to the development of pore
space rights. The discussion begins by locating the current state of pore space
property doctrine in an initial absolute stage of development, in which property
rights are nearly absolute and determined by a principle of first use. To avoid, as
much as possible, a tragic waste of pore space capacity by overuse, Part V describes
the need for pore space property rights to become limited and relative. Having
established the need to relativize pore space rights, Part V then addresses advantages
and disadvantages of doing so under an instrumentalist reasonable use standard and
a formalist rule of strict proportionality.
Finally, Part V attempts to synthesize a definition of relative pore space rights
that is neither strictly utilitarian nor strictly proportional. This definition, which I
call the “fair-opportunity doctrine,” is based on the principle that all owners of
common pore space are entitled to the fair opportunity to utilize the pore space
17

See Part IV.A.
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capacity of a reservoir. Derived principally from oil and gas correlative rights
doctrine, the fair-opportunity doctrine states that an owner in a common reservoir
may use any quantity of pore space anywhere in the reservoir, so long as it does not
interfere with the lawful existing operations of other owners, or deprive other owners
of a fair opportunity to either conduct like operations from their respective land or
participate in the proposed operations.
Part VI briefly concludes by summarizing the key lessons from the models of
semicommon property and the contours of the fair-opportunity doctrine.
II. THE UNREGULATED PORE SPACE SEMICOMMONS
A. Physical Background
The subsurface of land is comprised of layered, widely distributed formations
of rock (the crust) on top of a highly dense mantle, floating on a flexible, molten
core. Human activity, including mining and drilling for water and hydrocarbons,
occurs only in the crust.18 Temperature and pressure increase with depth, such that
rock formations in the crust are under varying amounts of pressure.19 Not all rock
formations in the crust are absolutely solid. Sedimentary rock contains void “pore”
spaces occupied by oil, natural gas, freshwater, or brine.
The volume of pore space within a given rock formation is its “porosity.”20
Porosity can be thought of as the rock’s capacity for fluid storage. The degree to
which a rock’s pore spaces are interconnected is its “permeability.”21 Rock
formations that are sufficiently porous and permeable to contain and transmit fluid
resources like water,22 oil, and natural gas are called “reservoirs.”23 Broadly

18

John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 994

(2008).
19

Id. at 993–95.
“Porosity” refers to the pore spaces, or openings in a rock that are not occupied by
the solid framework of the rock material. It can be thought of as the rock’s capacity for
storage. The entire porosity is always completely occupied by fluid, either oil, gas, or water.
Seldon B. Graham Jr., Fair Share or Fair Game—Great Principle, Good Technology—But
Pitfalls in Practice, 8 NAT. RES. LAW. 61, 72 (1975) (citing to S.E. BUCKLEY, ED.,
PETROLEUM CONSERVATION 50 (Am. Inst. Mining & Metallurgical Eng’rs, 1951)); S.J.
PIRSON, OIL RESERVOIR ENGINEERING 30 (2d ed. 1958).
21
Itzchak E. Kornfeld, Geology, The Marcellus Shale, Experts, & Dispute Resolution,
116 W. VA. L. REV. 865, 884 (2014).
22
Reservoirs containing groundwater are called “aquifers.” See THOMAS C. WINTER,
JUDSON W. HARVEY, O. LEHN FRANKE, & WILLIAM M. ALLEY, GROUND WATER AND
SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1139 (1999),
https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1998/1139/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K2X-S3RL].
23
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS 831
(7th ed. 1987).
20
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speaking, then, each reservoir consists of four parts: (1) solid rock strata, (2) pore
space, (3) fluid minerals and water within the pore space, and (4) natural pressure.24
B. Pore Space as a Common Pool
Under the ad coelum doctrine, rights to produce fluids from, or inject fluids
into, the pore space of a reservoir initially lie with each owner of land overlying the
reservoir.25 The borders of reservoirs, however, generally transcend the legal
boundaries of land ownership such that reservoirs are owned by numerous
landowners. Although reservoirs are legally segmented into individual parcels of
ownership, they are physically interconnected. Changes in pressure caused in any
separately owned part of a reservoir inherently affect pressures throughout the entire
reservoir. For example, assume A were to drill a producing oil well from the surface
of her property into the underlying Mississippi Lime formation, a known oil and gas
reservoir. A’s wellbore would become a pressure sink capable of draining pressure
and fluids (like oil and connate water) from throughout the reservoir, including the
portions underlying A’s land and that of her neighbor B.
If, instead of production, A were to use the well to inject produced water,
hazardous waste, carbon dioxide, or the like, the wellbore would pressurize the
Mississippi Lime formation and drive pressure and fluids laterally from the wellbore
into pore space under A’s and B’s land. Thus, A cannot use her portion of the
Mississippi Lime without diminishing the portion available to B. For this reason, the
Mississippi Lime, like all pressure-connected reservoirs, is “rivalrous,”
“depletable,” or “subtractable.”26
By virtue of this inherent interconnectedness, and the difficulty in demarcating,
monitoring, and enforcing boundary lines beneath the surface, property interests in
the subsurface are also nonexcludable.27 Landowners with rights in a common
reservoir are entitled to use the reservoir, even parts of it beyond their own tract, but
not to exclusively possess any portion of it.28 Property in subsurface resources are

24

See David Edward Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir Development—An Alternative to
the Rule of Capture for the Ownership and Development of Oil and Gas, 4 J. ENERGY L. &
POL’Y 1, 50 (1983).
25
See David E. Pierce, Employing a Reservoir Community Analysis to Define and
Marshall Correlative Rights in the Oil and Gas Reservoir, 76 LA. L. REV. 787, 789–90
(2016) [hereinafter Pierce, Reservoir Community Analysis].
26
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 32–33 (1990) (referring to such resources as “subtractable.”).
27
Schremmer, supra note 5, at 340–42; see also Tyler Cowen, Public Goods, LIBR.
ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html [https://perma.
cc/C4ZN-RYKB] (last visited June 30, 2020) (noting that “‘[n]onexcludability’ means that
the cost of keeping nonpayers from enjoying the benefits of the good . . . is prohibitive.”).
28
See Schremmer, supra note 5, at 375–76.
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more like a usufruct29 than a fee simple in land. In the above example, B would have
no right to exclude A from using her portion of the Mississippi Lime, even though it
may indirectly drain fluids from, or inject fluids into, the Mississippi Lime as it
underlies B’s land. B would generally have only an action for damages if A’s use of
the Mississippi Lime were to interfere with B’s existing legal use of the formation.
Encroachments by one owner into the subsurface of a neighbor’s land are therefore
nuisances, as opposed to trespasses.30
Common reservoirs qualify as a type of “common-pool resource.”31 As with all
common pool resources, consumption of a common reservoir of oil and gas, water,
or pore space by one owner necessarily diminishes the overall corpus of the reservoir
available to the other owners. Allowing unbounded consumption incentivizes each
owner to use as much of the reservoir’s pore space or contents as quickly as possible.
Rapid overuse dissipates the natural pressure that energizes the reservoir and
diminishes its ultimate productive capacity to the disadvantage of the other reservoir
owners and the public. This is an underground version of the “tragedy of the
commons.”32
On the other hand, totally prohibiting use of the resource by any and all owners
renders it valueless, both to the owners and the public. It turns out that the
intermediate position is best—the total value of a reservoir to all owners, as well as
the public, is maximized by allowing limited consumption by each owner.
Coordination and cooperation, rather than competition, are necessary to maximize
the reservoir’s ultimate value for production, storage, or both.33
C. Pore Space as Limited Common or Semicommon Property
In legal terms, the foregoing characteristics mean that reservoirs, or more
precisely the fluids and pore space within them, are a form of commons. The

29

See David E. Pierce, Resolving Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling Conflicts Using
a Reservoir Community Analysis, 90 N.D. L. REV. 249, 250–51 (2014) [hereinafter Pierce,
Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling] (discussing how “[i]n many ways the usufructuary
nature of water is similar to use of a reservoir to maximize removal of oil and gas. No single
owner ‘owns’ the geophysical system where the oil and gas reside, but they all seek to use it
to recover the oil and gas within.”).
30
Schremmer, supra note 5, at 375–76.
31
See OSTROM, supra note 26, at 30 (defining “common-pool resource[s].”).
32
David E. Pierce, Carol Rose Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis
Applied to Modern Reservoir Problems, 19 PENN. ST. ENV’T. L. REV. 241, 249–50 (2011)
[hereinafter Pierce, Modern Property Analysis] (citing Carol M. Rose, Expanding the
Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to
Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENV’T. L. & POL’Y F. 45, 49 (1999)).
33
See generally OSTROM, supra note 26, at 29–57 (discussing theoretical approaches
to self-governance of common pool resources).
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commons is limited, however, to the owners of land above the reservoir.34 Modern
commentators, led by Professor Carol Rose, have studied common property regimes
for resources held by a discrete number of owners rather than the public at large.
Variously termed “limited common property” by Rose and “semicommon property”
by others, including Professor Henry Smith,35 the theory generally holds that rights
in semicommon property are nonexclusive and relative among the common owners,
but absolute and exclusive as to the rest of the world. In other words, the property
interest is partly private and partly common.36 In a series of influential articles,
Professor David Pierce has identified oil and gas reservoirs as a form of limited
common property.37 Pierce conceives of a common reservoir as a community of
owners whose “members[hip]” in the reservoir “community” is determined by virtue
of owning a tract of surface land overlying the reservoir.38
Rose describes “limited common property” as “property on the outside,
contract (or norms) on the inside . . . .”39 The norms or consensual agreements that
develop on the “inside” among common owners to manage and allocate rights to use
the property40 are essential to managing common pool problems and avoiding a

34

See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900) (stating that rights to produce
from a common reservoir are “vested only in the owners” of an interest in the surface of land
overlying the reservoir).
35
In this Article, I will use “semicommon” and “limited common” interchangeably to
refer to such types of property.
36
See generally, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce,
& Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 719–20 (1986) [hereinafter Rose,
Comedy of the Commons] (discussing property as involving elements of both private and
public ownership); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000) (discussing how property rights are “a mix
of common and private rights . . .”).
37
See, e.g., Pierce, Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 25, at 788–89
(discussing the relationship between various landowners for mineral rights); Pierce, IntraReservoir Horizontal Drilling, supra note 29, at 260 (noting that “‘ownership’ is
correlative”); Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 252 (highlighting the
article’s goal to “clarify and elaborate property entitlements” in a community context); David
E. Pierce, Developing a Correlative Rights Doctrine to Accommodate Development of Oil &
Gas in Arkansas, 68 ARK. L. REV. 407, 407–08 (2015) [hereinafter Pierce, Correlative Rights
Doctrine] (describing the article’s focus on a community oriented approach to mineral
rights).
38
Pierce, Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling, supra note 29, at 250 (citing JOHN S.
LOWE ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON OIL & GAS LAW 21 (6th ed. 2013)).
39
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 177 (1998) [hereinafter Rose,
Several Futures of Property].
40
Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENV’T. L. 1, 26–27 (1994) (noting that common property is often “enforced”
internally by “customs and norms”).
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tragedy of the commons.41 Because limited common property is often held by closeknit groups,42 norms of reciprocity are quick to develop, and contractual
arrangements are relatively low-cost to negotiate and implement. For example, in
the early days of commercial oil development in the United States, norms and
contractual arrangements commonly coalesced among developers to coordinate
production of the reservoir.43
There may be many reasons these kinds of ad hoc arrangements are less
common in the modern oil patch, including the growth of the industry and
appreciation of transaction costs involved in striking bargains with all interested
owners. The most significant reason may be the proliferation of techniques for
production, injection, and storage in common reservoirs, leading to disputes that are
more diverse and complex than the reservoir problems encountered in earlier times.44
The presence of numerous players and technical complexity increases transaction
costs and depresses the likelihood of consensual solutions to problems of reservoir
and pore space use.45
D. The Regulatory Void
In the absence of custom or contract to govern production and use of limited
common property by common owners, state actors often step into the breach. Per
Rose, while the governance of common goods “may be solved by collective
agreements among the owners of the resources, such agreements are costly and,
particularly where a large number of parties must be involved, private collective
action is not always possible . . . . Thus a governmental body might be the most
useful manager where many persons desire access to or control over a given
property . . . .”46
41

Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 249 (citing Carol M. Rose,
Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable
Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes, 10 DUKE ENV’T. L. &
POL’Y F. 45, 49 (1999)).
42
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1,315, 1,320 (1993) (discussing
property “regimes” adopted by “close-knit groups,” which can develop efficient internal
rules of governance by virtue of their closeness).
43
See TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE SHAPED THE
WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 67–71 (2010) (describing ad hoc contractual arrangements among
owners in common oil fields).
44
For a survey of the variety of modern-day subsurface use disputes, see Schremmer,
supra note 5, at 342–73; Owen L. Anderson, Subsurface “Trespass”: A Man’s Subsurface
Is Not His Castle, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 247, 255–81 (2010).
45
Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL. STUD. 13, 22 (1985).
46
Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 36, at 719–20; see also Keith B. Hall,
Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Lines Is There an Actionable Subsurface
Trespass?, 54 NAT. RES. J. 361, 372–75 (2014) (demonstrating that governmental regulation
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During the twentieth-century, state-specific administrative regulation indeed
filled the gap in regulation of extraction hydrocarbons,47 and to some extent
groundwater,48 from common reservoirs. These statutory and regulatory
conservation schemes are limited in their scope, however, and generally do not
regulate use of pore space for waste storage, carbon dioxide sequestration, or
unconventional hydrocarbon production techniques. No regulatory scheme
systematically regulates common owners’ use of pore space itself,49 as they do for
the extraction of substances contained within the pore space. The dearth of statutory
regulation leaves many open questions. How much of the pore space volume may A
occupy for carbon dioxide sequestration within a reservoir stretching under land
owned by B, C, D, E, and F? What, if any, compensation might A owe to the others
for occupying too much?
Moreover, statutory conservation laws largely do not address disputes
occasioned when uses of pore space extend into neighboring property, or when
multiple conflicting pore space uses clash. Administrative agencies are generally not
empowered to adjudicate subsurface property rights or determine tort liability for
encroachments caused by, for example, waste disposal and storage, hydraulic
fracturing, gas storage, or horizontal drilling.50 What’s more, no overarching
administrative regime exists to coordinate conflicts between subsurface activities
governed under separate regulations. What happens, for example, when one
common owner’s saltwater injection operation (regulated through the Underground
Injection Control Program51) interferes with another owner’s oil production
operation (regulated under state-specific conservation regulations52)? In
unconventional resource plays, where the use of modern production technologies
like horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing is necessary, intra-reservoir disputes

is likely necessary to manage the conservation of limited common property in oil and gas
reservoirs).
47
See infra Part III.D.2.(a).
48
See infra Part III.C.4.
49
Several states have adopted statutory schemes for permitting and measurement for
aquifer storage and recovery (ASR) that may be said to regulate the use of pore space for
storage of usable water indirectly. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-90-9107.6 (West
2020) (requiring application for ASR); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.151–157 (West 2020)
(authorizing ASR).
50
See R. Lee Gresham & Owen L. Anderson, Legal and Commercial Models for PoreSpace Access and Use for Geologic CO2 Sequestration, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 701, 734–42
(2011) (stating, “[a]s with title issues, regulatory bodies have no general authority to
authorize trespasses or other torts,” and reviewing cases elaborating on this statement).
51
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-27 (West 2020).
52
See, e.g., Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 574, 576–78 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993) (involving the plaintiff’s claims of trespass arising from interference with oil
production caused by the defendant’s neighboring saltwater disposal operation); Tidewater
Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1963), abrogated by Fransen v. Conoco,
Inc., 64 F.3d 1481 (10th Cir. 1995) (same).
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that fall outside the scope of existing conservation regulation are increasingly
common.53
Many statutory schemes address certain reservoir-scale activities on a
piecemeal basis through compulsory pooling or unitization of interests. Compulsory
schemes effectively coordinate property rights to accomplish certain kinds of pore
space uses, such as secondary and enhanced recovery, to avoid property disputes
and holdouts among reservoir owners.54 However, even where administrative law
authorizes the creation of units for certain reservoir activities, such unitization does
not preclude the holder of a non-unitized interest from suing the unit for violating
its common law property rights at the unit’s boundaries.55
Hence, the use of pore space in common reservoirs is largely unregulated.
Where use of common pool resources is not governed by custom, contract, or state
regulation, the task falls to the common law of property and tort to define rights and
resolve disputes after they happen. Since norm, contract, and regulation of pore
space is lacking, common law principles play a major role in defining and defending
pore space property rights. Yet, the common law has not developed a robust scheme
of pore space property rights.56 Subsurface property disputes, such as encroachments
caused by waste disposal, secondary and enhanced recovery, natural gas storage,
hydraulic fracturing, and horizontal drilling, often appear to be decided on an ad hoc
basis.57
53
See Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 264 (noting how “[a]bsent
regulation, the common law of acceptable conduct within the reservoir will be defined by
what is currently viewed as prudent operating practices”). For recent litigation arising over
hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling operations, see, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Co. v.
Garza Energy, Tr., 268 S.W. 3d 1 (Tex. 2008) (concerning hydraulic fracturing); Stone v.
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013 WL 2097397 (N.D. W. Va. Apr. 10,
2013) (concerning hydraulic fracturing); Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2018) (concerning hydraulic fracturing), vacated and remanded by Briggs v. Sw.
Energy Prod. Co., 224 A.3d 334 (Pa. 2020); Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore,
LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017) (concerning horizontal drilling).
54
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-152 (West 2020) (“The ownership of all pore
space in all strata below the surface lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in
the several owners of the surface above the strata.”). For example, Wyoming’s statutory
scheme for carbon storage provides for unitization and entitles “all owners within the
unit . . . to share proportionately in the economic benefits generated by the sequestration
activities.” Righetti, supra note 2, at 10436.
55
Id. at 10437.
56
See Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 249 (noting that “correlative
rights” as a concept arose “at the turn of the century and has been somewhat of a sleeping
right since . . .”); see 1 KUNTZ, OIL AND GAS LAW § 4.3 (noting that “the elements which are
included within the collective term ‘correlative rights’ have not been judicially classified or
analyzed . . .”). See, e.g., Pierce, Correlative Rights Doctrine, supra note 37, at 407 (noting
that “Arkansas lacks a comprehensive, common law correlative rights analysis for oil and
gas”).
57
See Schremmer, supra note 5, at 318–19.
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Courts tend to privilege subsurface invasions from liability when they result
from an activity deemed societally beneficial and do not cause actual damages to the
plaintiff.58 Only landowners who have previously established uses of reservoir pore
space are entitled to damages for interference with those established uses.
Accordingly, pore space rights are governed by a default principle of first
occupation, akin to an inverse rule of capture, in which prior use vests an absolute
right to continue the use free from interference. 59
As the following discussion details, semicommon property rights often start as
absolute rights established on a principle of first possession, and then develop into
relative rights limited by a principle of reasonable or proportional use. The following
discussion traces the development of three forms of semicommon property in other
common pool natural resources (i.e., resources that are rivalrous and nonexcludable)
to derive lessons for refining the property rights regime for pore space.
III. MODELS OF SEMICOMMON PROPERTY
A. General Principles of Semicommon Property Doctrine
This Part sketches the trajectory of common law regulation of three forms of
semicommon property in natural resources: riparian waters, groundwater, and oil
and gas. The development of each of these areas roughly proceeds in three stages.
In the first stage, a common owner’s rights in the semicommon property are
absolute. These absolute rights entitle the owner either to absolute freedom from
disturbance of the resource, or to absolutely use the resource regardless of the effects
on other owners. As demand for the resource grows and competition for the resource
starts to involve large numbers of parties, the absolute rule starts to produce
inefficient and wasteful results, leading to modification through the common law
process and a second stage of development.
In the second stage, the extent of rights in the semicommon property is limited
by doctrine prohibiting disproportionate or unreasonable use of the resource. In this
manner, rights in the resource transform from being absolute to being relative (or
“correlative”). Where, however, the resource is critically scarce and permanently
depletable, rights tend to revert back to being absolute and precisely defined. In this
third stage, rights are absolute but limited in ways the initial stage rights are not. Yet,
even in this stage, rights sometimes undergo relativization as conditions of scarcity
and depletion lead courts and legislatures to permit reasonable impairment of the
otherwise absolute right.
Describing rights in property as relative implies an obligation on each owner to
limit their use of the property. The contours of the limiting principle differ across
58
See Anderson, supra note 44, at 271, 255–81 (surveying cases and noting that liability
lies only where the invasion interferes with an existing or “foreseeable” use by the plaintiff
of the subsurface).
59
See infra Part V.A.1 (describing the current state of pore space property rights in the
case law).
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types of property and periods of time. Some limiting principles require proportional
use, in which each owner’s use of the pool is stinted to a determinate amount. Others
limit use based on a number of case-specific facts intended to strike a maximally
efficient balance of competing interests under a standard of reasonableness. As will
be seen, choosing between formalist proportionality rules and instrumentalist
reasonableness standards to define rights animates the management of semicommon
property.
B. Riparian Waters
The common law of water rights provides a robust model for the development
of semicommon property in which rights move from absolute to relative and,
sometimes, back again. The form of water most closely analogous to pore space is
groundwater, which is water contained in the pore space of subsurface aquifers.
Nonetheless, the common law of riparian waters also furnishes a paradigm of
semicommon property rights, and warrants discussion here.
1. Post-Medieval Water Rights Begin as Absolute Under Natural Flow
and Ancient Use Doctrines
As Professor Joshua Getzler observed in his authoritative A History of Water
Rights at Common Law, the medieval English law of water rights was more
procedural than substantive, and was “subsumed within various categories of action
dealing with the wrong of nuisance,” and eventually trespass on the case.60 In the
fifteenth- and sixteenth-centuries, however, the substantive property law principle
took root that riparian owners had a right to enjoy the flow of a stream undisturbed,
and thus could contest any use of the stream that disturbed its “natural flow.”61 The
only exception from this natural flow doctrine was for disturbances that resulted
from an activity that had existed for such a substantial period that it effectively
entitled the user to a prescriptive right to use the stream in that fashion.62 Under this
so-called “ancient use” doctrine, water uses established since “time immemorial”
were absolute and entitled to continue without interference. The doctrine did not
protect mere occupancy; uses that were old but not sufficiently ancient to establish
a prescriptive right enjoyed no protection from interference and would be liable for
interfering with an ancient use.63

60

JOSHUA GETZLER, A HISTORY OF WATER RIGHTS AT COMMON LAW 52, 100 (2004);
see also T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 MO. L.
REV. 60, 82 (1963) (noting the preoccupation of the law during this time with matters of
pleading rather than of substance).
61
GETZLER, supra note 60, at 117.
62
Lauer, supra note 60, at 84–85.
63
Id. at 84.
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2. The Rise of Occupancy as the Basis of Water Rights—Blackstone and Sic Utere
Tuo
Starting around the seventeenth-century, the basis of water rights began to shift
from prescription by ancient use to mere occupancy or appropriation. This
transformation was part of a larger trend toward a view of property rights as
reciprocal or “correlative.”64 The famous 1610 nuisance case William Aldred’s
Case,65 contributed to correlativity theory the important maxim, “sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas,” or “so use your own property as not to harm that of another.”66
There, Benton was held liable for nuisance for operating a hog sty so as to interfere
with Aldred’s residence. Lorde Coke cast Aldred’s right to use his property in the
established manner without interference “in terms of natural necessity rather than
prescription.”67 In other words, Aldred was entitled to protection from interference
based merely on the fact of his prior use or occupancy, and Benton was liable for
causing harm to it by subsequent use of his own property.
Following Aldred’s Case, sic utere tuo became the foundation of the water
rights doctrine that would largely supplant natural flow and ancient use—
Blackstone’s prior appropriation doctrine. Blackstone wrote his famous
Commentaries during a time, in the later eighteenth-century, when competition for
streams to generate waterpower had “vastly intensified.”68 With the increasing
application of waterpower to ever more industrial uses, disputes over the use of
common watercourses became more frequent and began to involve more parties.69
Under these conditions, the stability previously furnished by the natural flow
doctrine began to collapse.70
Against this backdrop, Blackstone argued that water rights were acquired by
establishing a prior use, or “occupancy,” of water rather than by proving an ancient
use.71 In Blackstone’s system, once established by appropriation, a water right was
coextensive with the appropriative use.72 Further, by application of sic utere tuo,
subsequent competing uses of the watercourse were permitted only to the extent they

64

Theorizing rights as “correlative” was seen as a way for courts to compromise
competing absolute rights without eroding the natural law theory underpinning property law.
GETZLER, supra note 60, at 122; see also Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of
Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 207–208 (1990) (discussing the
rise of correlative conceptions of property rights in nineteenth century nuisance law).
65
Aldred’s Case (1610), 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 9 Co. Rep. 57 b.
66
Id. at 821.
67
GETZLER, supra note 60, at 123.
68
Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water
Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 273 (1990) [hereinafter Rose, Common-Law Water Rights].
69
See id.
70
Id.
71
GETZLER, supra note 60, at 154.
72
See Lauer, supra note 60, at 97–98.
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did not interfere with a prior use.73 Thus, Blackstone’s application of sic utere tuo
was strict and formalistic; any interference with an owner’s prior appropriation of
water was actionable. As Blackstone illustrated, “[t]hus if A builds a mill upon the
river Wye, B may not subsequently take water from the Wye above A’s mill in such
quantities as to interfere with the operation thereof.”74
Water law in nineteenth-century Britain and eastern states in the United States
came to reflect much of Blackstone’s prior appropriation doctrine.75 More broadly,
sic utere tuo remained the starting point for analyzing nuisances and water-use
disputes through the nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries. Despite its long
reign, the maxim was incomplete as a model of property rights. The difficulty in
applying sic utere tuo is in determining what constitutes laedas or harm. As
Professor Jeremiah Smith observed in 1917,
If by laedas be meant damage, the maximum [sic] is untrue as a legal
proposition; since the legal exercise of a right is often accompanied with
the infliction of positive harm upon another. If by laedas be meant injury
in the literal sense of an unlawful act (in and jus), an act in violation of
another’s legal right, then the maxim is a mere truism or identical
proposition. It does not tell us what is a legal right or what constitutes a
violation of a legal right.76
Sic utere tuo depends on an initial determination of the plaintiff’s right that is
allegedly interfered with; it does not itself define those rights.77 Like Lord Coke in
Aldred’s Case, Blackstone resolved the distinction by conflating interference and
legal injury, such that any and all interferences with a prior use of water were
actionable. Some seventeenth- and eighteenth-century courts, however, exercised
policy discretion in defining the extent of plaintiffs’ rights. These courts would
permit interferences by acts that produced social good, in an attempt to balance the
73

GETZLER, supra note 60, at 186.
Lauer, supra note 60, at 97.
75
See, e.g., Hatch v. Dwight, 18 Mass. (17 Tyng) 289, 296–97 (1821) (declaring that
“the owner of a mill site, who first occupies it by erecting a dam, and mill, [had the] right to
water sufficient to work [the mill], . . . ; notwithstanding he may, by his occupation, render
useless the privilege of any [owners] above or below him upon the same stream”).
76
Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One’s Own Property as a Justification for
Damage to a Neighbor, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 383, 389 (1917) (footnotes removed). For the
same reason, Justice Holmes lumped sic utere tuo together with alienum non laedas as
“hollow deductions from empty general propositions.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege,
Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894).
77
See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 359
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“This maxim does not mean that one must never use his own
property in such a way as to do any injury to his neighbor. It means only that one must use
his property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another.”) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
74
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interests of competing property owners and of the public.78 Such implicitly
utilitarian applications of sic utere tuo continued into the nineteenth-century.79
3. Rights Fully Relativize Under Reasonable Use Doctrine
Sic utere tuo took on an explicitly utilitarian character in American riparian
rights doctrine. Starting in the early nineteenth-century, Blackstone’s prior
appropriation doctrine began to yield to a new, American riparian doctrine based on
the principle of “reasonable use.”80 Under the reasonable use doctrine, “riparian
owners had limited[,] but more or less equal[,] rights to use [a common] stream,”
and “could cause some inconvenience to other owners” without liability.81 The turn
to reasonable use began in the New York courts.82 In Platt v. Johnson, for example,
New York’s Supreme Court construed sic utere tuo to permit an upstream mill to
occasionally deny water to downstream users.83 Getzler characterizes this holding as
“a radical recasting of the seventeenth-century English use of sic utere tuo expressed
in Aldred’s Case.”84
The turning point for the broad adoption of the reasonable use doctrine was
Justice Story’s opinion in the 1827 federal case, Tyler v. Wilkinson.85 Tyler involved
a complex dispute among several mill owners on the Pawtucket River.86 Writing for
the Court, Justice Story stated that the stream’s flow was owned equally by all
riparian owners, and, somewhat ambiguously, that there was no right to diminish the
water or disturb the flow for other owners except by “a reasonable use,” which in
turn meant a productive purpose.87 In this way, Story manipulated the meaning of
laedas (legally actionable harm) to exclude damage caused by another’s productive
use of the stream. Story explained that, in determining whether an interfering use is
78

See GETZLER, supra note 60, at 126 (“It has been argued that seventeenth-century
nuisance law gave the courts a policy discretion to manipulate the sic utere tuo standard and
so strike a social balance between useful modes of land use, leading eventually to highly
malleable fault and negligence standards for torts to land.”).
79
See Lewin, supra note 64, at 201–02 (“For dynamic theorists, sic utere tuo was
secondary to the right of property owners to make productive use of their property. These
theorists restricted the scope of the sic utere tuo doctrine ‘by narrowly interpreting the word
‘laedas’’ to mean not ‘injury’ but ‘legal injury.’ Legal injury could only result from a legal
wrong, an unlawful act. If the defendant had the legal right to make a particular use of his
property, then the damage inflicted on the plaintiff was damnum absque injuria, or damage
without legal wrong or legal injury.”).
80
Lauer, supra note 60, at 61–62.
81
Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 282–84.
82
Id. (citing Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. Cas. 307 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)).
83
Platt v. Johnson, 15 Johns. 213, 218–20 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818).
84
GETZLER, supra note 60, at 273.
85
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 473–74 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14312).
86
Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 285–86 (discussing the details
of the dispute).
87
GETZLER, supra note 60, at 274–76.
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reasonable, the law makes “reasonable reference to public convenience and general
good . . . .”88 Morton Horwitz famously argued that Story’s overtly utilitarian
reasonable use standard “became almost immediately an open-ended formula
through which common law judges could implement their own conceptions of
desirable social policy.”89
Over time, individual jurisdictions adopted particularized criteria for
reasonableness, such as rules precluding inter-basin transfers of water, 90 and rules
granting priority among incommensurable uses of water for domestic, agricultural,
and industrial purposes (with the typical rule preferring domestic uses over all
others).91 Many of these modifications are reflected in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Section 850A describes the relevant considerations in determining
reasonableness, which includes, among others, the purpose, economic and social
values of the use, the suitability of the use to the body of water, the extent of the
harm the use causes, and the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the
method of use or amount of use by the proprietors.92 Riparian cases are thus “often
resolved by the use of principles similar to the law of nuisance.”93
Commentators are divided in explaining the shift from absolute rights under
natural flow doctrine to relative rights under reasonable use. In The Transformation
of American Law, Horwitz contends the absolute conception of property led to
“anticompetitive results” that burdened economic growth.94 Other commentators
have also noted that natural flow doctrine “discouraged the development and use of
water.”95 In Horwitz’s account, the shift to a more relaxed doctrine of reasonable use
purposely subsidized capitalist developers by allowing them to inflict injury on
weaker members of society without liability, so long as they did so with due care.96
Carol Rose, on the other hand, takes the view that the absolute regime seemed
to function efficiently when water-use disputes involved few—usually only two—
parties. But, as increased water use led to interruptions of flow and pollution from
88
89

Tyler, 24 F. Cas. at 474–75.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 39

(1977).
90

City of Canton v. Shock, 63 N.E. 600, 603–04 (Ohio 1902) (noting a riparian has no
right to transfer water to persons outside of the basin).
91
See, e.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 492, 495–96 (1842) (prioritizing
use of riparian waters for “natural wants” like drinking, household purposes, and water for
cattle, over “artificial wants” such as irrigation and manufacturing purposes).
92
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (AM. L. INST. 1979).
93
A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE JR., DAVID H. GETCHES, REED D. BENSON,
& SARAH F. BATES, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY 133 (6th ed. 2009).
94
HORWITZ, supra note 89, at 101–02, 34–35.
95
Lauer, supra note 60, at 84.
96
HORWITZ, supra note 89, at 102 (noting that “courts began to strike a balance between
competing land uses, freeing many economically desirable but injurious activities from legal
liability if they were exercised with due care”).
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upstream sources that implicated large numbers of downstream claimants, the
doctrine turned toward reasonable use. Reasonable use doctrine, argues Rose,
distributed rights to use water more widely, thus avoiding many of the transaction
costs that made dispute resolution involving large numbers of claimants difficult.97
4. Absolute Rights Based on Prior Appropriation Rise Again in the West
While reasonable use doctrine was taking hold in the East, miners in western
American states were developing an informal water rights regime based on prior
appropriation principles similar to Blackstone’s.98 Modern prior appropriation
initially arose as custom in California mining camps, where miners lacked
ownership rights in the land and could not claim riparian rights as such.99 The custom
eventually came to be adopted as doctrine by courts in western states, which
preferred it to reasonable use.100 As Carol Rose chronicles, “in the West . . . scarcity
and the need for careful husbanding of water resources drove water law beyond
riparianism’s vague correlative rights, and into the more expensive but also more
effective appropriation regime of individual property rights in water.”101 Prior
appropriation was eventually formalized by western legislatures through adoption
of state administrative structures to allocate, monitor, and coordinate trading of
appropriative rights.102
Professor Rose posits that the return to stricter, more absolute water rights in
western states was the result of higher levels of scarcity and the predominant use of
water for consumption (usually irrigation) rather than power generation, as in the
East. Water used for irrigation, for example, is mostly consumptive, and thus poses
a zero-sum game for potential users—where A’s irrigation leaves less for B. Water
used for instream power generation, as by a mill, on the other hand, is not
consumptive in this sense, but is more like a “renewable” resource. 103 Higher levels
of scarcity justified the higher administrative costs associated with allocating strict
property rights under prior appropriation.

97

See Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 282.
The doctrine has roots in English common law’s notion of occupancy to establish
water rights based on first possession, and is similar to Blackstone’s prior appropriation
theory. See Mark T. Kanazawa, Efficiency in Western Water Law: The Development of the
California Doctrine, 1850–1911, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 166 (1998).
99
Reed D. Benson, A Few Ironies of Western Water Law, 6 WYO. L. REV. 331, 333
(2006).
100
Burke W. Griggs, Beyond Drought: Water Rights in the Age of Permanent
Depletion, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1,363, 1,271–72 (2014); see, e.g., Coffin v. The Left Hand
Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 443–44 (1882) (explicitly adopting prior appropriation doctrine and
rejecting riparianism).
101
Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 265.
102
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-1-1–-2 (2020).
103
Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 290–92.
98
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Moreover, prior appropriation functions more efficiently in times of drought
than reasonable use. Appropriative rights are prioritized based on the time of first
appropriation. Senior rights in the priority chain are entitled to full satisfaction of
their appropriative right before any junior interest may partake. In times of severe
drought, when there is insufficient water to satisfy the needs of all claimants, at least
senior rights holders are nonetheless able to make beneficial use of what little water
remains. In contrast, under reasonable use, riparian rights holders must share the
shortage, such that none of them may have enough water for crops, and the little
water they did apply would go to waste.104 Prior appropriation doctrine thus allocates
water use rights more efficiently in drought conditions, which are more common in
the arid West than in the East.
As a doctrine of western water law, prior appropriation’s greatest challenges
have arisen in allocating rights to groundwater resources, which, unlike surface
waters, are largely nonrenewable and depletable. As such, the details of the doctrine
are outlined more fully in the below discussion of groundwater rights.105
***
To summarize the development of riparian water rights after the medieval
period, the period began with an absolutist view of rights in a watercourse under
which riparians were categorically protected from disturbance, except by ancient
uses, which were themselves categorically protected from disturbance. Later, mere
occupancy supplanted prescription as the basis for water rights as seventeenthcentury courts essentially rendered all rights incidental to land, including riparian
rights, relative in theory under the maxim sic utere tuo. At first, under Blackstone’s
prior appropriation doctrine, water rights established by a prior use were deemed
nearly absolute even under sic utere tuo. However, English and American courts in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gradually allowed social concerns to weigh
in their determinations of property rights under the maxim. In the American West,
however, where water is scarcer than in the East and its use was mostly consumptive,
rights again hardened to become absolute under modern prior appropriation
doctrine. These broad themes, as seen below, are echoed in the development of
groundwater rights.

104
See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1302; see also Burke W. Griggs, Water: Practical
Challenges and Legal Rights to Acquire and Recycle Water for Hydraulic Fracturing, 56
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. J. 69, 84–85 (2019) [hereinafter Griggs, Water for Hydraulic
Fracturing] (describing prior appropriation doctrine).
105
See infra Part III.C.4.
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C. Groundwater106
1. Acton v. Blundell and Absolute Ownership
For much of history, underground waters received significantly less attention
as a matter of local custom and judicial decisions than riparian waters. Modern
groundwater law started to develop in earnest only in the mid-nineteenth century,107
with the leading case of Acton v. Blundell.108 The plaintiff sued after the defendant’s
mining operations cut off the underground stream that drove the machinery in the
plaintiff’s cotton mills. In denying the plaintiff relief, the court declined to consider
rights in groundwater as relative or limited by any version of sic utere tuo.109 On the
contrary, Acton held that a landowner is privileged to make any use of waters
beneath its ad coelum-defined tract of land, regardless of whether it interferes with
another’s ability to use the same waters.110 Acton essentially adopted a rule of
capture for groundwater.
In declining to apply sic utere tuo, Acton gave considerable weight to the fact
that subterranean waters are unseen and their natural flows and courses unknown.
The court expressed doubt about its ability to determine the necessary facts to
adjudicate an alleged interference with producing groundwater wells.111 Other
contemporaneous courts likewise eschewed a relative rights rule because it would
entail significant problems of proof and other administrative impracticalities.112
106
For a discussion of the different categories of underground waters, see Joseph W.
Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 265–66 (2013). For
present purposes, I will use “groundwater” to refer generally to sources of underground
water.
107
For an early account of groundwater rights, see generally Henry Budd, The Law of
Subterranean Waters, AM. L. REG. 237 (1891).
108
Acton v. Blundell (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223; 12 M. & W. 324.
109
Budd, supra note 107, at 238–39.
110
Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1,234–35; 353–54,5 (quoting the Digest [39.3.1.12]
(Marcellus)).
111
Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1,223; 324; see also Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 271–72
n. 49 (noting that Acton admitted non-liability was the only possible rule for groundwater
interference due to the lack of understanding about the nature of groundwater).
112
See, e.g., Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am.
Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (1984) (“Because the existence, origin, movement and
course of such waters, and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so secret,
occult and concealed, that an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them
would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically
impossible.”); Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 54 (1855) (“But we think the law governing
running streams is not applicable to underground water, and that no light can be obtained
from the law of surface streams; and if it is to be established that there are correlative rights
existing, between adjoining proprietors of land, to the use of water percolating the earth, an
entire new chapter in the law will be necessary to define what these rights are, and to put
them on some tangible and practical ground, that the rules concerning them may be applied
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In England, Acton v. Blundell’s absolute rule of capture doctrine became the
rule, though judges quickly expressed dissatisfaction. In the 1857 case of Chasemore
v. Richards, for example, Coleridge, J., dissenting, opined that the rights of adjoining
landowners in percolating waters should be governed by sic utere tuo rather than
Acton.113 In America, Acton was widely adopted initially, particularly in eastern
states, which Horwitz attributes to nineteenth-century American judges’ laissezfaire ideologies and general desire to promote economic development.114
Even so, New Hampshire courts early on suggested that the right of a landowner
to appropriate subterranean waters is limited by the corresponding right of his
neighbor. Only five years after Acton, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted
a rule of reasonable use for groundwater, highly similar to Tyler v. Wilkinson’s rule
for surface waters.115 New Hampshire law thus illustrates that the move from the
first stage of absolute rights to a second stage of relative rights need not occur over
generations.
2. Rights Become Limited Under Stress of Scarcity and Depletion—
The Groundwater Revolution
Many states that initially followed Acton subsequently limited its reach
doctrinally or legislatively.116 The rule proved problematic as technological
innovations in the mid-twentieth century sharply increased demand for groundwater.
These innovations included the high-pressure centrifugal pump, capable of drawing
water at greater rates and from greater depths;117 rural electrification, which made
pumping for groundwater financially attractive;118 and inexpensive irrigation pipe,

to common use. But from the very nature of the case, this seems impracticable.”) (emphasis
in original).
113
Chasemore v. Richards (1857) 157 Eng. Rep. 71; 2 Hurlst. & N. 186, 195–96
(Coleridge, J., dissenting).
114
HORWITZ, supra note 89, at 105–08.
115
Subterranean and Percolating Waters; Springs; Wells, 55 A.L.R. 1385, I.b.2.(b).(1)
(1928) (citing Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 82 Am. Dec. 179 (1862); Swett
v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870)).
116
Of the western states, where groundwater is often a critically scarce resource, only
Texas stills follows the rule of capture. Gabe Collins, Blue Gold: Commoditize Groundwater
and Use Correlative Management to Balance City, Farm, and Frac Water Use in Texas, 55
NAT. RES. J. 441, 447 (2015) (indicating that the Texas rule springs from deep historical
roots, including the English common law, Roman law, and Mexican law). A small handful
of American jurisdictions still follow an unlimited rule of capture for groundwater. These
include Indiana, Maine, and Texas; only in Texas has the common law rule of capture largely
survived despite legislative limitations. Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 274–76.
117
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 266–68.
118
Clyde O. Martz, The Law of Underground Waters, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 26, 27 (1958)
(providing a contemporaneous account of the effects of the groundwater revolution).
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which permitted rapid expansion of irrigation capacity and thereby increased
agricultural demands on water supplies.119
The explosive growth of groundwater extraction—termed the “groundwater
revolution”120—created resource scarcity and depletion in areas where demand
outstripped supply.121 In the arid American West, groundwater levels were quick to
decline (and pumping costs quick to rise), making the resource more costly and
harder to access for many potential users, and reducing stocks available to
posterity.122 The New Mexico Supreme Court summarized the problem of
administering water rights in a non-rechargeable basin in Mathers v. Texaco, Inc. as
follows: “Each appropriator . . . reduces in amount, and in time of use, the supply of
water available to all prior appropriators, with the consequent decline of the water
table, higher pumping costs, and lower yields.”123
These problems were, and continue to be, compounded by the fact that many
western groundwater aquifers, while huge, are effectively nonrenewable. Thus,
extraction of groundwater is mostly consumptive and groundwater supplies are
depletable.124 Unlike surface waters, which even in times of drought are not
permanently depleted, groundwater resources are subject to permanent depletion by
extraction exceeding the rate of recharge—sometimes called “groundwater
mining”125 or “over-appropriation.”126 “Such problems could only result in stresses
on the received groundwater law” of Acton’s rule of capture.127
Additionally, though less significantly, the convenience of Acton’s rule of
capture diminished in importance as technical knowledge about, and the ability to
control, subsurface waters improved. As Professor Joseph Dellapenna observed,
adopting limitations on groundwater rights “reflected a growing confidence that
more knowledge was available regarding groundwater than when the absolute
dominion rule developed.”128

119

Id.
See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1282.
121
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 266–68.
122
See generally Robert Emmet Clark, Ground Water Legislation in the Light of
Experience in the Western States, 22 MONT. L. REV. 42 (1960) (discussing western states’
legislative responses to scarcity of groundwater resources).
123
Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771, 775 (N.M. 1966).
124
See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1,298, 1,282–84 (describing the Ogallala aquifer as
an example).
125
Paula K. Smith, Coercion and Groundwater Management: Three Case Studies and
a “Market” Approach, 16 ENV’T. L. 797, 802 (1986).
126
See Griggs, supra note 100, at 1,296–98 (distinguishing drought from depletion from
“permanent depletion”); see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The
Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENV’T. L. 241, 249–53 (2000) (discussing
groundwater depletion by “overdrafting”).
127
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 266–68.
128
Id. at 290.
120
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These changes in circumstances influenced jurisdictions to temper the rule of
capture in various ways.129 Some adopted a correlative rights doctrine that permits
each reservoir owner to extract its proportional share of available groundwater.
Others follow a reasonable use principle, similar to riparian law, in which rights to
use water are determined on multiple factors intended to achieve an efficient use of
available water. A few states have replaced the reasonable use rule with a
straightforward application of nuisance law.130 Many states in the American West,
which is especially arid, instead adopted a modern prior appropriation rule. Each
alternative means of limiting the absolute appropriation rule is reviewed briefly
below.
3. Correlative Rights Doctrine, Reasonable Use, and the American Rule
In groundwater law, the rule of correlative rights and the rule of reasonable use
are related. Under the doctrine of reasonable use, limits on landowners’
appropriation of water are determined by balancing the interests of the appropriator,
other owners in the aquifer, and the public.131 Under correlative rights doctrine, in
contrast, limits are determined strictly in proportion to the size of the owner’s
landholdings in the aquifer.132 Many courts have conflated the two doctrines, or
combined them into a so-called “American rule.”133
The rules, though similar, are in fact distinct.134 They are similar in that both
correlative rights and the reasonable use rule limit the absolute rule of capture by
requiring sharing of groundwater resources among owners in the common aquifer.135
At a general level, both concepts indicate that each owner of a portion of a common
pool has legal privileges against other owners therein to use the common pool, as
well as corresponding duties not to impair other owners’ rights or diminish the
129

See Martz, supra note 118, at 30.
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 275–76 (citing, e.g., Neuse River Found., Inc. v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 574 S.E.2d 48 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Michels Pipeline
Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 347 (Wisc. 1974); James Burling, The Latest Take on
Background Principles and the States’ Law of Property After Lucas and Palazzolo, 24 U.
HAW. L. REV. 497 (2002)).
131
For early decisions, see Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569, 574–75, 82 Am.
Dec. 179 (1862); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 446 9 Am. Rep. 276 (1870).
132
For early decisions, see Erickson v. Crookston Waterworks, Power & Light Co., 111
N.W. 391 (Minn. 1901); Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1902); Meeker v. City of E.
Orange, 74 A. 379 (N.J. 1909).
133
See, e.g., State v. Michels Pipeline Constr., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 349 (Wis. 1974)
(citing Subterranean and Percolating Waters; Springs; Wells, 55 A.L.R. 1,385 (1928)); see
also Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 270 (noting “a judicial tendency to treat the terms
correlative rights and reasonable use as merely variant ways of making the same point—that
water users drawing from a common source have interrelated rights such that each must
consider the equal clam of others on that source”).
134
See 93 C.J.S. Waters §§ 201–02 (2020).
135
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 270.
130
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ultimate value of the common pool to all owners.136 However, careful observers
distinguish between correlative rights and reasonable use based on the manner in
which they circumscribe owners’ rights.
As noted, under reasonable use, the extent of rights is defined by weighing the
utility of the defendant’s use of water against the harm to the plaintiff’s use.137
Section 850A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, for example, defines reasonable
use of groundwater resources based on the same utility-balancing test as for riparian
rights. This test is also closely related to the Restatement’s “balance of utilities” test
for nuisance liability.138 Thus, under the Restatement’s view, reasonableness of use
is determined case by case by balancing various factors intended to maximize social
utility, such as the purpose of the use, the suitability of the use to the watercourse,
the economic and social value of the use, the harm it causes, and the practicality of
avoiding the harm by adjusting one of the uses.139
Under the correlative rights rule, in contrast, an owner’s share of groundwater
from a common aquifer is determined in strict proportion to the surface acreage of
her tract.140 Unlike the reasonable use rule, the proportional correlative rights rule
leaves “no room for judicial adjustment of shares to reflect a judge’s appraisal of
what is the most reasonable use of the groundwater.”141 The strict, proportional
approach furnishes a more certain, but also more rigid, allocation of groundwater
versus the reasonable use rule. Correlative rights and the rule of reasonable use thus
represent alternative methods of divvying up commonly owned groundwater
resources.142
Some courts have dispensed with both reasonable use and correlative rights in
favor of a nuisance standard for governing the use of groundwater aquifers. For
136

See Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 257 (discussing that
“[c]orrelative rights ensure that each owner in a reservoir has the opportunity to fully develop
the oil and gas resource beneath his land, so long as he does so without unreasonably
interfering with the rights of other impacted owners”).
137
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 297.
138
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (AM. LAW INST.1979)
(defining reasonableness in use of water), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826
(AM. LAW INST. 1979) (defining reasonableness in use of land, i.e., nuisance). As the
Supreme Court of Nebraska observed, “The Restatement rule [of reasonable use] finds its
support in the principles of nuisance law . . . .” Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d
116, 129 (Neb. 2005).
139
See Spear T Ranch, 691 N.W.2d at 131 (“Thus, under the Restatement,
reasonableness of use is determined on a case-by-case basis and many factors can be
considered; the test is flexible.”).
140
See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. TIT. 82, §§ 1,020.2, 1,020.6. (2020).
141
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 278.
142
The task of allocating a reasonable amount to each common owner can alternatively
be, and in modern times often is, accomplished by legislation and regulation. GETZLER, supra
note 60, at 44 (“Ultimately the common law’s capacity to govern water entitlements proved
inadequate, and an ad hoc regime of private (and later public) statute was invoked to perform
the task.”).
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example, in Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co.,143 the Alabama Supreme Court,
following Florida precedent, held “that where a plaintiff’s use of groundwater,
whether it be for consumption or, as here, for support, is interfered with by
defendant’s diversion of that water, incidental to some use of his own land, the rules
of liability developed by the law of nuisance will apply.”144
4. Prior Appropriation Doctrine
Several western states follow a modern prior appropriation regime for
groundwater, which had been adopted from mining custom in the West for
governing rights in surface waters.145 In general, prior appropriation allocates use
rights based not on ownership of the appurtenant land, but on the prior act of
diverting water for beneficial use.146 Water rights acquired under the doctrine are
defined by the extent of the beneficial use, such that appropriators receive a property
interest in a discrete, quantifiable amount of water.147 When there is not enough
water to satisfy all water rights, priority is determined by the principle, “first in time,
first in right.”148 Thus, “[i]n times of shortage, the holder of a senior water right has
the legal right to use all of the water authorized under that right, and junior rights
holders generally cannot fulfill their rights until the senior rights have been
satisfied.”149
In this sense, appropriation rights are absolute and prohibit a junior rights
holder from interfering with (called “impairing”) a prior right in any manner.150 This
feature distinguishes prior appropriation rights from correlative rights and
reasonable use rules, which balances the equities of various right holders in times of
shortage.151 This feature makes prior appropriation rights more efficient in times of
scarcity. It marshals as much water as possible to satisfy senior rights so that they
may continue their beneficial uses, rather than force all holders to reduce their
stocks, perhaps to levels that cannot sustain any beneficial use.152

143

Henderson v. Wade Sand & Gravel Co., Inc., 388 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1980).
Id. at 903.
145
See supra Part III.C.4. Most western states largely codified prior appropriation
principles, with certain modifications, in the late nineteenth- or early twentieth-century. Reed
D. Benson, Alive but Irrelevant: The Prior Appropriation Doctrine in Today’s Western
Water Law, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 675, 676 (2012) [hereinafter Benson, Alive but Irrelevant].
146
See Griggs, Water for Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 104, at 84–85.
147
See Benson, supra note 99, at 334 (noting about the prior appropriation doctrine,
“[t]he bedrock principle of western water law is that beneficial use is the basis, the measure
and the limit of a water right”).
148
Griggs, Water for Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 104, at 84.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. For a thorough summary of prior appropriation rights, see id. at 84–87.
152
Griggs, supra note 100, at 1,313.
144
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While appropriation rights are absolute, they are limited in scope. Unlike
absolute rights under Acton’s rule of capture, prior appropriation rights permit use
of an authorized quantity of water.153 An appropriation right is also limited in terms
of where the water may be produced from (the “point of diversion”), where the water
may be used, and what purpose the water may be used for.154 These limitations are
costly to administer and monitor, which helps account for why prior appropriation
is the law only in states where water is scarce and, in the case of groundwater,
depletable.
The over-appropriation brought about by the groundwater revolution led
legislatures in some western states to modify the extent of appropriative rights.155
As early as 1957, Kansas redefined the meaning of “impairment” under its prior
appropriation act to permit interference with a senior appropriative right within
“reasonable economic limit[s].”156 Colorado likewise adopted a modified prior
appropriation doctrine for certain nonrenewable groundwater, which protected
appropriative rights not absolutely, but only to the extent of “reasonable
groundwater pumping levels.”157 Both states also changed prior appropriation law
to authorize local groundwater management districts to, among other things, impose
restrictions on pumping by senior water rights and require rights holders to share
shortages.158 Likewise, as Professor Reed Benson has chronicled, Idaho’s courts and
legislature modified the state’s prior appropriation regime to limit prior
appropriation rights by “conditions of reasonable use.”159
Thus, once established, groundwater rights in prior appropriation jurisdictions
are generally absolute except as limited statutorily. Statutory limitations made in
light of over-appropriation and critical scarcity tend to relativize appropriative rights
by permitting reasonable impairment of senior rights by junior holders and
authorizing local management bodies to impose shared reductions. These changes
moved modern appropriative rights in groundwater closer to correlative rights or
reasonable use.

153

Griggs, Water for Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 104, at 86.
Id. at 86–87.
155
Griggs, supra note 100, at 1284.
156
Id. at 1284–85 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. ¶ 82a-711 (Kan. L. 1957, ch. 539, § 16)
(1957)). As Griggs details, the state’s policy of liberally granting water rights applications
substantially enabled over-appropriation of groundwater despite the limitation imposed on
appropriative rights by the definitional change. Id. at 1285.
157
Id. at 1288 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-102(1) (2014)).
158
See id. at 1,289–95 (discussing Kansas and Colorado groundwater management
statutory schemes).
159
Benson, Alive but Irrelevant, supra note 145, at 691–95. In his article, Professor
Benson highlights other statutory and judicial modifications of prior appropriation principles
in New Mexico and Washington. See generally Benson, Alive but Irrelevant, supra note 145.
154
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***
To summarize, groundwater rights, like riparian rights, began as absolute and
largely relativized as the availability of groundwater became a concern. The extent
of relative rights in groundwater is determined differently in different jurisdictions.
In reasonable use jurisdictions, the extent of rights is determined, as with riparian
rights, by balancing the interests of the parties and the public. Certain states
supplanted the doctrine with nuisance, which itself determines relative rights on a
test of reasonableness. In correlative rights jurisdictions, rights are determined
strictly in proportion to the size of each owner’s land holdings overlying the aquifer.
In prior appropriation jurisdictions, where groundwater is extremely scarce and
subject to permanent depletion, prior use of groundwater vests absolute rights in the
full extent of the established use. These rights are stinted, if at all, by statutory
limitations that often impose reasonableness restrictions on use.
D. Oil and Gas
As a model of semicommon property rights, oil and gas law is the closest
analogy to reservoir pore space. Pore space activities predominately occur in active
and depleted oil and gas reservoirs, including injection and disposal of produced
water, hazardous and nonhazardous wastes, carbon storage, horizontal drilling, and
hydraulic fracturing.160 As discussed above, however, oil and gas conservation laws
generally do not address these and other uses of pore space.161 Hence, it is necessary
to identify the common law principles governing common pools of oil and gas, as
they exist independently of statutory modification, to guide development of pore
space property doctrine.
As with common law riparian and groundwater rights, principles of oil and gas
property were developed in stages. At the advent of commercial oil and gas
production in the United States, rights to produce oil and gas from common
reservoirs were determined by an Acton-like rule of capture. The waste of resources
that resulted from overproduction incentivized by the rule of capture is famous. Oil
and gas law accordingly moved into the second stage of development, in which the
rule of capture was tempered statutorily by conservation regulation, and doctrinally
by a weak theory of correlative rights. Conservation statutes generally retain the
absolute character of capture rights, but limited their scope.
Because state legislatures stepped into the breach and limited the rule of
capture, correlative rights doctrine is not as fully developed as its counterparts in
water law—correlative rights and reasonable use. This doctrinal limitation, though
weak, nonetheless serves to relativize rights to common pools of oil and gas. The
significant scholarly debate over the precise meaning of correlative rights reflects
the tension between determining property limitations based on a rule of strict
proportionality or, instead, by a reasonableness standard.
160
161

See Schremmer, supra note 5, at 321–24.
See supra Part II.D.
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1. Absolute Rights and the Rule of Capture
In general, courts deciding issues of ownership of oil or gas in early cases
followed the approach of Acton v. Blundell and applied an absolute ownership rule
to oil and gas.162 Under this “rule of capture,” an owner of land “acquires title to the
oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved
that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.”163 At bottom, the rule of
capture is a tort privilege or a rule of non-liability as much as it is a principle of
property ownership.
The necessary corollary to the rule of capture is the offset drilling rule,164 as
illustrated in Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co.165 There, the defendant drilled multiple oil wells
within 25 feet of the plaintiff’s lease line, allegedly with the malicious intent of
draining oil from the plaintiff’s tract. The plaintiff sued to enjoin the defendant from
drilling or operating wells within 200 feet of the property line to protect the
plaintiff’s oil and gas from draining into the defendant’s wells. The court denied
relief on the grounds that “[t]he right to drill and produce oil on one’s own land is
absolute” and that injunctive relief was precluded because the plaintiff had an ample
self-help remedy: drill a line of offset protection wells along the defendant’s
tract . . . .166 Offset drilling thus became the exclusive remedy for damage by
drainage.167
As some of the early opinions articulate, the absolute rule of capture is
administratively convenient. Early courts and litigants lacked sophisticated
understanding of the behavior of oil and gas in unseen reservoirs, and the absolute
rule avoided the administrative and information costs168 of proving drainage and
allocating production.169 Yet, while it enjoyed cost advantages, the negative
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See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENV’T. L. 899, 904 (2005).
163
Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil
and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935). For discussion of the history and development of
the rule of capture in oil and gas law, see generally DAINTITH, supra note 43.
164
See Kramer & Anderson, supra note 162, at 900 (referring to the offset drilling rule
as the rule of capture’s “evil twin”).
165
Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897).
166
Id. (emphasis added).
167
See Barnard v. Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907) (holding that
a landowner’s only remedy for drainage of oil from under his land by a neighbor’s well is to
“go and do likewise,” i.e., drill an offset well).
168
“[I]nformation costs . . . include the cost of measuring stocks or flows of a resource,
and of delineating, monitoring, and enforcing property rights to them.” Henry E. Smith,
Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446
(2008) [hereinafter Smith, Governing Water].
169
Kramer & Anderson, supra note 162, at 927 (discussing Edwards v. Lachman, 534
P.2d 670 (Okla. 1974)).
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consequences of the absolute rule are well documented.170 Briefly, the rule of capture
and the offset drilling rule incentivized the drilling of many more wells than were
necessary to efficiently produce oil and gas reservoirs.171 This resulted in needless
expenditure of capital and excessive use of surface property for wells.172
Additionally, the legal regime incentivized production of more oil than market
demand could bear and caused price instability.173 Finally, and most importantly,
unrestrained production prematurely dissipated the natural energy of reservoirs that
drives oil and gas into wellbores in the first place, trapping a great deal of
hydrocarbons in the reservoir forever.174
In sum, the absolute ownership regime led to many forms of physical and
economic waste and a classic example of a tragedy of the commons. Moreover,
understanding of the physical characteristics of oil and gas reservoirs improved
rapidly. By the 1920s, it was apparent that a strict rule of capture was not completely
justified on the ground that the behavior of oil and gas is unknowable.175
Nonetheless, the rule remained administrative- and information-cost-effective.
2. Limits on Capture Under the Correlative Rights Doctrine
The legal response to rampant waste resulting from the absolute rule of capture
primarily came from state legislatures, which adopted conservation statutes to limit
the scope of capture rights. These statutes do not relativize capture rights, but instead
merely place administrative limitations on where and how capture rights may be
exercised through rules governing well spacing, density, and prorationing of
production from individual wells.176 The resulting rights to produce oil and gas are
absolute, in that they do not impose reciprocal duties among owners, but narrowed
by administrative limitations, somewhat like groundwater rights under modern prior
appropriation statutes.177

170
For discussion of the waste of reservoir energy and drilling of needless wells, see
generally Hardwicke, supra note 163, at 391–92 n.1; Robert E. Hardwicke, Oil-Well Spacing
Regulations and Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99, 111 (1952);
Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1219–21 (1938).
171
Hardwicke, supra note 163, at 391–92 n.1.
172
DAINTITH, supra note 43, at 8; Hardwicke, supra note 163, at 391 n.1.
173
See DAINTITH, supra note 43, at 9; Hardwicke, supra note 163, at 391 n.1.
174
Ely, supra note 170, at 1,219–20; DAINTITH, supra note 43, at 9.
175
DAINTITH, supra note 43, at 9–11 (discussing the early critic of the rule of capture,
Harry Doherty, who campaigned for unitization in the 1920s).
176
See David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas
Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 760–66 (2009)
[hereinafter Pierce, Maximizing Production Conservation]; Gruger v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 135 P.2d 485, 488 (Okla. 1943) (holding that such administrative limits imposed by
conservation statutes do not abrogate the rule of capture).
177
See supra Part III.C.4.
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The principal common law limitation that developed to temper the absolute
extent of oil and gas rights under the rule of capture is the correlative rights doctrine.
Although, “[t]he term ‘correlative rights’ has meant different things to different
people at different times,”178 it generally describes judicial limitations on an absolute
application of the rule of capture.179 Courts have long recognized that property rights
in a common pool of oil or gas are relative because of the physical
interconnectedness of reservoirs,180 and have accordingly upheld statutory limits on
the rule of capture against takings challenges.181 However, because of the success of
such statutory conservation regimes, few courts have had occasion to precisely
define the common law limits on oil and gas ownership. The substantive content of
oil and gas correlative rights doctrine thus remains unsettled. The doctrine has
developed, such as it has, primarily through scholarly literature.
Professor Summers provided an early and influential definition of correlative
rights as follows:
(a) each owner of an interest in a common source of supply of oil and gas
has a legal privilege, as against the other owners, to take oil and gas by
lawful operations, limited by dual duties to the other owners (b) not to
injure the source of supply, and (c) not to take an undue proportion of the
oil and gas.182
The dual duties of Summers’s definition address two aspects of property rights in a
common pool. The first—the duty not to damage the source of supply—proscribes
the manner of using elements of the common pool. I will call this the “conduct
prong.” The conduct prong is universally accepted as an element of common
178

Kramer & Anderson, supra note 162, at 903 n.9.
Id. at 903 n.9, 911–12.
180
The Supreme Court of the United States first identified rights in a common source
of oil or gas supply as “correlative” in the 1900 case of Ohio Oil v. Indiana. The Court noted
that while the “surface proprietors within the gas field all have the right to reduce to
possession the gas and oil beneath . . . there is a co-equal right in them all to take from a
common source of supply . . . .” Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209–10 (1900)
(emphasis added); see also 1 SUMMERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 3:4 (3d ed.) (“These
‘correlative rights’ were not created by the statute in question, but existed because of the
physical properties of oil and gas.).
181
1 SUMMERS, supra note 180, at § 3:4; Maurice H. Merrill, The Evolution of Oil &
Gas Law, 13 MISS. L.J. 281, 289–90 (1941); see also Robert E. Hardwicke & M.K.
Woodward, Fair Share and the Small Tract in Texas, 41 TEX. L. REV. 75, 79 (1962) (noting
the power to regulate production may be “based on the ‘police power,’ which includes the
authority to make effective the legal maxim [sic utere tuo]”).
182
1 SUMMERS, supra note 180, at § 3:3. See also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
(MTBE) Prods., 457 F. Supp. 2d 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) and Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 516 A.2d
990 (Md. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that these dual duties—the duty not to injure the
reservoir and not to take an undue portion—are similar to limitations imposed on owners’
conduct in groundwater aquifers).
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owners’ correlative property rights. The second—the duty not to take an undue
portion of the oil and gas—addresses the allocation of the contents of a common
pool among its owners. I will call this the “allocation prong.” Courts and
commentators generally have not accepted Summers’s version of the allocation
prong.183 I will examine each prong, starting with the allocation prong.
(a) The Allocation Prong: The Duty Not to Take an Undue Portion
Much like groundwater law’s correlative rights doctrine, under Summers’s
definition of correlative rights, an owner would be entitled to a share of production
from the common pool of oil or gas in proportion to the surface area of his tract
overlying the pool. Summers envisioned that each owner’s portion of oil and gas in
place in a common pool could be determined by technical information about the
reservoir.184 The American Petroleum Institute (API) initially held the same view,
writing in 1931 that “each owner of the surface is entitled only to his equitable and
ratable share of the recoverable oil and gas energy in the common pool in the
proportion which the recoverable reserves underlying his land bears to the
recoverable reserves in the pool.”185
However, as Professor Pierce has observed, “[i]f this principle were applied
literally, then a producer would have to stop producing once it had recovered its
‘equitable and ratable share of the recoverable oil and gas’ from the reservoir,”
which would “severely limit the rule of capture and the entrepreneurial spirit that
the rule inspires.”186 Perhaps with similar concerns in mind, the API amended its
position in 1942, stating that “each operator should have an opportunity equal to that
afforded other operators to recover the equivalent of the amount of recoverable oil
(and gas) . . . underlying his property.”187
Courts also adopted a fair-opportunity definition of correlative rights, as
opposed to a fair-share definition,188 as did legislatures when drafting conservation
statutes.189 Contemporary commentators are likewise emphatic that correlative
rights merely entitle an owner to the opportunity to produce and not a particular
183

Pierce, Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling, supra note 29, at 256.
1 SUMMERS, supra note 180, at § 3:3.
185
Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 569–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting
Graham, supra note 20, at 64–65).
186
Pierce, Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 25, at 800.
187
Wronski v. Sun Oil Co., 279 N.W.2d 564, 570 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting
Graham, supra note 20, at 65) (emphasis added).
188
See, e.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W. 2d 559, 562 (Tex. 1948) (stating
that a landowner’s “reasonable opportunity to produce his fair share of the oil and gas [in a
common reservoir] is the landowner’s common law right under our theory of absolute
ownership of the minerals in place”).
189
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-33; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60-103 (West);
58 PA. STAT. ANN. § 402 (West); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 22C-9-2 (West); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1509.01 (West).
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share of production.190 Accordingly, the doctrine has not developed, as envisioned
by Summers, to specifically delimit the proportion of production an owner may take
from a common reservoir.191
How does the doctrine uphold common owners’ rights to a fair opportunity to
produce from the common reservoir? In most cases, self-help under the offset
drilling rule provides an effective means of ensuring each owner’s opportunity to
produce a common reservoir by permitting each owner to drill offset wells in the
reservoir from the surface of their land.192 Thus when A sinks a producing well into
the Mississippi Lime and drains oil from a portion of the formation underlying B’s
land, B’s recourse is to go and do likewise.193 Under the rule of capture, B may drill
an offset well on her own property and drain oil from the portion of the Mississippi
Lime underlying A’s (or C’s, D’s, E’s, etc.) land. The law will provide no recourse
for B if she fails to do so, as her correlative right is merely the opportunity to produce
the reserves.194
Certain kinds of reservoir conduct, however, even when done with reasonable
care, deprive other owners of the opportunity to conduct similar operations. The
primary examples are secondary and tertiary recovery operations, like waterflooding
or carbon dioxide flooding, which inject fluids to sweep hydrocarbons into
producing wellbores from large swaths of a depleted reservoir. The sheer areal extent
of operations like these prevent every owner in a common reservoir from engaging
in them at once.
Thus, while “[e]ach owner in a common source of supply has the correlative
right to a fair opportunity to conduct secondary recovery operations,” before
conducting such an operation, an owner must extend a fair opportunity to the other
reservoir owners to participate in the operation. This rule avoids unjust enrichment
of both the active owner and passive owners. The active owner must offer each
passive owner a reasonable chance to enjoy a share of the value of the operations,
and passive owners are not entitled to block the operations to extract an unjust
portion of the value.195
190

Pierce, Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling, supra note 29, at 256–58; e.g., 1 BRUCE
KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 5–16 (3d ed.
2010).
191
Pierce, Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling, supra note 29, at 255–72.
192
Elliff, 210 S.W. 2d at 562 (explaining that, under the fair-opportunity principle, “if
all operators exercise the same degree of skill and diligence, each owner will recover in most
instances his fair share of the oil and gas”); see also A.W. Walker Jr., Property Rights in Oil
and Gas and Their Effect upon Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 373–
74 (1938) (“The ‘correlative right’ . . . is simply the remedy of self-help, to wit, the right to
drill offset wells which will counteract and equalize the drainage between the two tracts.”).
193
See Kelly v. Ohio Oil, 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897).
194
See, e.g., id.; see also Walker, supra note 192, at 373–74.
195
See 1 KUNTZ, supra note 56, § 4.8 (citing Reed v. Texas Co., 159 N.E.2d 641 (Ill.
App. 1959)); see, e.g., Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W. 2d 510, 518–19 (Neb.1969)
(holding that an oil and gas lessee who withheld consent from a reasonable offer to unitize

2021]

PORE SPACE PROPERTY

35

(b) The Conduct Prong: The Duty Not to Damage the Source of Supply
The conduct prong of common law correlative rights is much more developed
than the allocation prong, yet remains crudely defined.196 Lacking judicial
development, much of the jurisprudence concerning the limits on reservoir conduct
is found in the scholarly literature. Three of the most prominent commentators in
this field since Summers have been Professors Eugene Kuntz, David Pierce, and
Owen Anderson. I will briefly survey each scholar’s theory of reservoir conduct in
turn.
(i) Professor Kuntz’s “Special Community”
Writing after Summers, Kuntz developed a view of correlative rights grounded
in reservoir-specific standards of conduct.197 Kuntz described the common reservoir
as a “special community”198 in which owners’ rights to develop are defined by social
standards of conduct.199 Per Kuntz, “[i]t is a simple doctrine that owners of rights in
a common source of supply may not inflict loss upon one another by conduct which
is considered to be socially undesirable.”200 The social acceptability of conduct in
his model “must be determined, not only by applying the standards applicable to
conduct generally, but by also considering the utility of the conduct in the light of
its peculiar consequence to others operating in the same community.”201
Accordingly, Kuntz’s model defines the correlative duties of owners based on a
reasonableness, or negligence, standard: “While each operator owes a duty to use
due care in operations to protect the common source of supply from spoilage, there
is no liability for harm caused unintentionally in the absence of negligence, and the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.”202

its lease is precluded from seeking damages for trespass and drainage caused by unit
operations).
196
Pierce, Intra-Reservoir Horizontal Drilling, supra note 29, at 254 (discussing how
“[c]ourts have marshaled rights in the geophysical system only in the crudest of terms under
the rubric of ‘correlative rights.’ This is not because of a lack of technical expertise, but
rather the lack of an effective legal theory”).
197
1 KUNTZ, supra note 56, § 4.3; see also Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra
note 32, at 256–57 (comparing the views of Summers and Kuntz).
198
Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30 MISS. L.J. 1, 8 (1958); 1
KUNTZ, supra note 56, § 4.3.
199
Pierce, Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 25, at 803 (discussing Kuntz’s
“special community”).
200
1 KUNTZ, supra note 56, § 4.3.
201
Id.
202
Id. at § 4.5 (citing Larkins-Warr Trust Co. v. Watchorn, 174 P.2d 589 (Okla. 1946)).
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(ii) Professor Pierce’s Reservoir Community Analysis
Building on Kuntz’s reservoir community analogy, Pierce has developed a
mode of analysis for determining when particular reservoir conduct violates
community standards—the “reservoir community analysis.” Unlike Kuntz, Pierce
focuses on the “positive” correlative right to affirmatively develop the common
reservoir, even by use of the subsurface of other owners.203 Pierce defines owners’
correlative rights with reference to the characteristics of the particular reservoir and
what development techniques available at the time are likeliest to maximize ultimate
recovery of the oil or gas from the reservoir as a whole.204 Consequently, under
Pierce’s reservoir community analysis, “the correlative rights within a particular
reservoir community must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis,” and may evolve as
technology and oilfield practice change.205
Pierce’s reservoir community analysis involves basically three steps.206 The
first step is to define membership within the reservoir community by reference to
the ad coelum doctrine. Owners of land with ad coelum-defined boundaries that
overlie a reservoir enjoy correlative rights in the reservoir and are “members” of the
reservoir community.207 The second step is to define the physical attributes of the
reservoir, such as the reservoir’s porosity, permeability, pressures, lithology, and
fluid content and saturation. The goal is to evaluate, through expert testimony and
other technical evidence, the geological and geophysical characteristics of the
reservoir.208 The final step is to evaluate the activity impacting the reservoir with
reference to the reservoir’s physical attributes. In this step, “[t]he analysis should
consider only what is necessary to maximize development and value from” the
reservoir, ignoring collateral issues like impacts to the surface. 209 As with the second

203

David E. Pierce, New Subsurface Property Rights in an Old Trespass World, 65
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1, 4-9 (2019) [hereinafter Pierce, New Subsurface Property
Rights].
204
See Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 259 (discussing how
“[c]orrelative rights are a matter of time and place. The ‘time’ element considers the state of
the art in developing oil and gas. The ‘place’ encompasses the unique conditions presented
by a particular reservoir. Development techniques and practices appropriate for one reservoir
may be inappropriate for a different reservoir. Development techniques and practices that
were reasonable at one time may become unreasonable as they are eclipsed by new
techniques and practices”).
205
Id.
206
The following is drawn from Pierce, Reservoir Community Analysis, supra note 25,
at 804–06.
207
See id. at 804.
208
Id. at 805 (“Depending upon the conduct being evaluated, extensive geological and
geophysical information may be collected for consideration. The goal is to figure out how
the reservoir community works.”).
209
Id. at 805 n.104.
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step of the analysis, this step turns on expert testimony and technical evidence of
prevailing production techniques for reservoirs of that type.
Under reservoir community analysis, a reservoir owner may have to tolerate
certain physical entries into her subsurface, and resulting drainage, that are done
“reasonably [to] develop the reservoir.”210 For example, on the facts presented in
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust,211 no trespass would lie where
fractures from the defendant’s hydraulic fracturing treatment entered the plaintiffs’
adjoining subsurface. The plaintiffs accordingly would have no right to recover
damages for natural gas drained from their land into the defendant’s well. Reservoir
community analysis identifies two grounds for this result. First, the underlying tight
shale formation at issue in Garza could be produced efficiently only through
hydraulic fracturing. Second, while the plaintiffs must tolerate fissures and resulting
drainage under their land, by the same rule they may benefit from placing fissures
under neighboring land, including the defendant’s land.212
(iii) Professor Anderson’s Subsurface Trespass
Anderson has developed yet a different model of acceptable reservoir conduct.
Anderson’s “subsurface trespass” theory would privilege conduct that intrudes on
another owner’s portion of a common reservoir, “whenever the trespasser’s
subsurface intrusion accomplishes an important societal need (including private
commercial needs) if the subsurface owner suffers no actual and substantial
harm.”213 Anderson would privilege subsurface intrusions caused by waste disposal,
secondary and enhanced recovery, hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, natural
gas storage, and carbon storage—all on the basis that they are societally beneficial
and that damages are paid for actual harm caused.214 Anderson’s subsurface trespass
theory is a faithful synthesis of the case law dealing with such kinds of intrusions. It
is somewhat unclear, however, what criteria courts should use to determine when
subsurface intrusions are societally beneficial. It may be that any non-wasteful use
of the subsurface is “socially beneficial” for purposes of the rule.215
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Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 259–63.
Coastal Oil Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). Garza is discussed infra in Part III.D.3.(a).
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Pierce, Modern Property Analysis, supra note 32, at 259–63.
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Anderson, supra note 44, at 247; see also Owen L. Anderson, Lord Coke, The
Restatement, & Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 203,
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See Anderson, supra note 44, at 258–82 (discussing intrusions caused by these
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For a further discussion of the strict liability aspect of subsurface trespass, see
Schremmer, supra note 5, 350–52.
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3. Utility and Formalism in Defining Oil and Gas Correlative Rights
As in water law, the tension between defining relative common pool rights
formally, based on a rule of strict proportionality, and flexibly, based on an
instrumentalist “reasonable use” standard, run throughout the scholarship and case
law of oil and gas rights. As the following section summarizes, instrumentalist,
utilitarian standards dominate, though examples of formal rules also exist.
(a) The Dominance of Utilitarian Standards
Courts and commentators have generally rejected a strictly proportional
definition of correlative rights, as advanced by Summers, in favor of a contextsensitive reasonableness standard. Common reservoir owners, under such a rule, are
entitled only to a “reasonable” opportunity to produce a ratable share of the oil and
gas in place in the reservoir. In determining whether an owner’s reservoir conduct
is a “reasonable” exercise of its correlative rights, most scholars and courts consider
specific characteristics of the reservoir and the wider social context.
Kuntz’s view of correlative rights is explicitly utilitarian. In his definition,
reasonableness is defined with regard to whether the conduct is “considered to be
socially undesirable.”216 The standard of liability in Kuntz’s model is negligence,
itself a utilitarian concept.217 Anderson’s subsurface trespass model also expressly
references social benefit in determining when to privilege subsurface intrusions from
liability, though his model otherwise provides a clear ex ante rule of liability.218
Pierce’s reservoir community analysis also incorporates significant utilitarian
concepts.219 To determine whether given conduct is a reasonable exercise of the
actor’s correlative rights under reservoir community analysis, it is necessary to
reference the commonness of the activity in the locality and the social value of the
activity (i.e., the extent to which the activity efficiently produces the reservoir).220
Both considerations are also factors in the Restatement’s balance-of-utilities test for
nuisance.221 The ultimate goal of reservoir community analysis, as with utilitarian
versions of nuisance doctrine, is to order the rights of common owners so as to
maximize the value of the reservoir for them and the public at large.222
Utilitarian balancing also predominates in courts’ analyses of cases involving
intra-reservoir disputes. Three well-known cases are illustrative, and a brief
description of the role of utility and social context in determining the relative
216

1 KUNTZ, supra note 56, § 4.3.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (7th ed. 2007 Wolters
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See supra Part III.D.2.(b)(ii).
220
See supra Part III.D.2.(b)(ii).
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property rights of the parties in each case will suffice. In Railroad Commission v.
Manziel, an unleased mineral owner sued to enjoin a commission order permitting
water injection for secondary recovery on neighboring land, arguing that the injected
water would encroach into his subsurface and trespass on his interest. The court
denied an injunction, holding that the plaintiff’s property rights “do not exceed”
those of the injector when weighed in the context of the value of enhanced recovery
operations to the public.223 Consequently, the plaintiff’s property interest in the
common reservoir was subordinated to that of the injector for the purpose of
maximizing production from the reservoir.224
The Texas Supreme Court construed Manziel broadly in a later subsurface
trespass case, Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, characterizing it as
holding that “a salt water injection secondary recovery operation did not cause a
trespass when the water migrated across property lines . . . .”225 In Garza, the Salinas
parties claimed that hydraulically fractured fissures from Coastal’s offset natural gas
well invaded their tract and wrongfully drained natural gas into Coastal’s well.
Because the Salinas parties’ interest in the common reservoir happened to be
nonpossessory, under Texas law they could establish liability only by showing actual
damages. The question thus became whether the drainage of natural gas from
transboundary frac fissures, which clearly damaged the Salinas parties’ interest,
constituted a legal violation of their interest.
The court resolved the dilemma in favor of no liability—finding invasion and
drainage by frac fissures to be damnum absque injuria—based on four, largely
public policy, rationales: (1) the law already affords the Salinas parties full recourse
in the form of drilling a self-help offset well; (2) “allowing recovery for the value of
gas drained by hydraulic fracturing usurps to the courts and juries the lawful and
preferable authority of the Railroad Commission to regulate oil and gas production;”
(3) “determining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic fracturing is the kind
of issue the litigation process is least equipped to handle”; and (4) “no one in the
industry appears to want or need” the rule of capture to apply differently to drainage
by hydraulic fractures that cross property boundaries.226 Each of the latter three
considerations is expressly utilitarian in that it references social context to determine
the property rights of the parties in the dispute.
A final example, also from the Texas Supreme Court, is Lightning Oil Co. v.
Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC.227 Lightning Oil owned an oil and gas lease on the
Briscoe Ranch. The dispute arose when Anadarko obtained a lease from the surface
owner of the Ranch to drill horizontal wellbores from a surface location on the
Ranch to produce from its own oil and gas lease on adjoining land, where it was not
permitted to disturb the surface. Lightning Oil sued to enjoin Anadarko’s drilling
223
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operations, asserting the proposed wellbores would trespass Lightning Oil’s interest
in the mineral estate.
The court began its analysis by adopting the court of appeals’ description of the
legal nature of the surface estate, including the geological substrate. The surface
estate, the court stated, includes the surface overlying a mineral estate as well as the
ownership rights in “the geological structures beneath the surface,” and “all nonmineral ‘molecules’ of the land, i.e., the mass that undergirds [the surface estate].”228
The mineral estate, according to the court, “is only entitled to ‘a fair chance to
recover the oil and gas in or under’ the surface estate.”229 The mineral estate
therefore lacks the right to exclusively control the earth surrounding any
hydrocarbon molecules, and can only bring a cause of action to defend its rights
against interference with its fair chance to recover the hydrocarbons.230
Based on this reasoning, the court held for Anadarko, finding that the proposed
wellbores would not interfere with Lightning’s “ability to exercise its rights” under
its lease.231 The Lightning Oil court further held that any minerals lost as a result of
Anadarko’s drilling through the subsurface would be outweighed by the interests of
Anadarko and the public in maximizing recovery of oil and gas by horizontal
drilling.232 Once again, in determining the extent of a litigant’s property interest in a
common reservoir, the Texas Supreme Court considered the social value of the
interfering activity.
(b) Examples of Formal Rules
While such instrumentalist versions of correlative rights doctrine dominate the
oil and gas literature and case law, there are examples of formalist applications as
well. Summers’s theory of correlative rights is non-utilitarian and formalist. In his
system, each reservoir owner would be entitled to a definite, ascertainable share of
reservoir production based on the size of the owner’s surface tract. An owner is liable
for taking more than its proportional share of production or injuring the source of
supply.233 Thus, under Summers’s theory, owners’ correlative rights are capable of
clear, determinate definition without reference to specific aspects of the reservoir or
social context.
Although Summers’s strict-proportional theory of allocating oil and gas in a
common reservoir has not gained wide adoption, some courts have applied other
kinds of formalist rules in resolving intra-reservoir disputes. These rules tend to
228
Id. at 46 (citing Humble Oil & Refin. Co. v. West, 508 S.W. 2d 812, 815 (Tex.
1974); Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Int., Inc. v. Nat’l Park Serv., 630 F.3d 431, 441 (5th Cir.
2011)).
229
Id. at 47 (quoting Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 480 S.W. 3d
628, 635 (2015) (citing Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 15)).
230
See id. at 47.
231
Id. at 49.
232
Id. at 51.
233
See supra Part III.D.2.
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incorporate the principle that reservoir owners have the fair opportunity to produce
a proportional share of the reservoir’s contents. Oklahoma law, for example, applies
“a modified private nuisance doctrine,” altered by a provision of the Oklahoma
Constitution that the Oklahoma courts have said “removes the common law
elements of carelessness or unreasonableness.”234 Oklahoma courts do not consider
the utility of the defendant’s injection operations,235 the commonness of the activity
in the locality,236 the implied consent or assumption of risk of the nonconsenting
owner,237 or the approval of a conservation agency.238
Under Oklahoma’s modified private nuisance doctrine, liability for trespass for
injection into a common reservoir lies only where it interferes with another’s
existing use of the common reservoir or his ability to use the common reservoir for
similar purposes. For instance, West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard held that
injection of saltwater that caused the plaintiff’s producing well to water out and
increased the plaintiff’s plugging costs was actionable because it interfered with the
plaintiff’s existing use of the reservoir.239 Compare West Edmond Salt Water
Disposal Association v. Rosecrans, which held that injection of saltwater into a
saline formation under the property of another was not actionable because it merely
displaced brine under the plaintiff’s property but did not prevent the plaintiff from
also using the formation for disposal.240
Decisions from Arkansas also demonstrate elements of a formalist approach
based on a fair-opportunity principle.241 Jameson v. Ethyl Corp. involved a
waterflood to produce bromine.242 The defendant injector was held liable to a
nonconsenting plaintiff mineral owner for the value of minerals that were drained
from the plaintiff’s tract in excess of natural depletion by the defendant’s operations.
234

Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp. v. Joiner City Unit, 444 F.2d 439, 441–42 (10th
Cir. 1971).
235
Id. at 443–44 (declining to modify Oklahoma nuisance doctrine to deny liability for
water encroachments based on the utility of the defendant’s secondary recovery operations).
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whether the subject oil and gas operations were common in the area surrounding the
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Greyhound Leasing, 444 F.2d at 445 (“We agree with the trial court that the defense
of assumption of risk was not available to the defendant.”); Fairfax Oil Co., 97 P.2d at 576
(declining to recognize a defense of implied consent).
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Greyhound Leasing, 444 F.2d at 444–45 (distinguishing authorities supporting the
view that administrative approval of conservation operations should immunize the operations
from liability for resulting damage).
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West Edmond Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730, 731–32 (Okla. 1954).
240
W. Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass’n v. Rosecrans 226 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1950).
The court also denied liability on the grounds that the saltwater, once injected, ceased to be
the property of the injector. Id. at 971.
241
See Pierce, Correlative Rights Doctrine, supra note 37, at 414–16, 423 (discussing
Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., infra note 242).
242
Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980); see also Pierce, Correlative
Rights Doctrine, supra note 37, at 414–16, 423.
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Liability in Jameson turned largely on the unavailability of self-help through offset
operations; even if the plaintiff was ready and willing to develop her portion of the
reservoir, she was effectively precluded from doing so by the defendant’s waterflood
operations.243
Jameson cited Young v. Ethyl Corp., in which the Tenth Circuit found an
actionable trespass where the defendant’s bromine recovery operations removed
brominated saltwater from under the plaintiff’s tract.244 In so holding, Young
predicted the Arkansas Supreme Court would decline to apply the rule of capture to
privilege the drainage,245 as the plaintiff’s tract was located within, as opposed to
outside of, the area of the defendant’s recovery operations, which prevented the
plaintiff from engaging in self-help operations.246
The Oklahoma and Arkansas cases thus provide examples of non-utilitarian
definitions of correlative rights based on the principle that each owner has an equal
opportunity to produce its ratable share of reservoir minerals. Under the case law of
those states, the extent of owners’ correlative rights is fairly determinate: a reservoir
owner is entitled to use the common source of supply in any manner that does not
interfere with another owner’s lawful existing use or opportunity to make a lawful
use.
***
In summary, the development of rights in common pools of oil and gas began
with the familiar rule of capture embodied by Acton v. Blundell. As demand for the
resource grew sharply, scarcity, permanent depletion, and waste abounded. Rather
than wait on the doctrine to respond through the common law process, state
legislatures passed statutes to curtail the place and manner of capture, but retained
the absolutism of the property right. The common law eventually developed a weak
correlative rights doctrine to relativize the right, which largely applied
instrumentalist principles of reasonable use rather than a formalist rule of
proportionality.
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Id. at 772–73 (discussing Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 474 S.W.2d 411 (Ark. 1971), where
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IV. LESSONS FROM THE MODELS FOR DEVELOPING RIGHTS IN A SEMICOMMONS
A. Lesson One: Use Rights Shift from Absolute to Relative (and Sometimes Back
Again) in Response to Resource Conditions
In the doctrinal histories of riparian, groundwater, and oil and gas law, rights to
use the resource tended to move, like an accordion, between being absolute and
being relative as physical and economic conditions changed. As Professor Carol
Rose has put it, definitions of property move back and forth between “crystal”
definitions and “mud” definitions.247 In the early days of development of a resource,
when competition for the resource is low or information about its physical nature
and behavior is prohibitively costly or unavailable, courts tend to adopt clear-cut,
absolute rights. Rights in this initial stage either absolutely forbid any disturbance
of the resource (e.g., rights under the natural flow doctrine) or absolutely permit
exploitation of the resource regardless of any resulting disturbance to the rights of
others (e.g., rights under the rule of capture).
In each case, the absolute rule in the initial stage appears to be convenient,
simple, and efficient for courts to administer, especially when little is known about
the physical nature of the resource. Moreover, the incentive effects of absolute rights
encourage resource development. Thus, absolute rights function well when
resources are sufficient to satisfy all interested users. When resources are no longer
able to satisfy all such demands, however, absolute ownership rights begin to cause
various forms of physical and economic waste. Under such conditions, the case
studies reveal, courts incline toward limiting the extent of absolute rights.
When demand for use of the resource increases and the resource grows scarcer,
absolute rights often yield to vaguer, correlative or reasonable use rights. Rights in
this second stage are relative; they permit more or less equitable access to the
resource among all holders. Relative rights enable “more or less informal group
control” over the resource. 248 When, however, the resource becomes extremely
scarce and valuable, it may be efficient to assign, administer, and monitor limited
absolute property rights in it. This third stage of development occurs when the
resource is nonrenewable and depletable, and use of the resource is principally
consumptive, as was the case for oil and gas reservoirs and western water supplies.249
Yet, even such limited absolute rights tend to become relativized by the imposition
of reasonableness principles when extraction of the resource leads to severe
permanent depletion.
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Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 295.
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of use rights in riparian waters. See generally Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note
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In the case of riparian waters, the natural flow doctrine protected riparians from
any and all disturbances of the flow of a watercourse, except those caused by longestablished “ancient” uses. Ancient uses, in turn, were absolutely free from
interference by junior users. This regime was simple to administer. In a case alleging
interference of a watercourse, only two factual inquiries were relevant: whether the
flow was impaired, and whether the interfering use was ancient.250 As
industrialization led to sharp increases in demand for watercourses to generate
power, however, the simple, absolute rule became untenable.251 Under the ancient
use doctrine, newer, competing water uses were difficult or impossible to develop,
because they lacked any protection from interference and would be liable for
interfering with vested uses.252 Because new users lacked rights under ancient use,
they could obtain rights only from ancient users contractually.
The overall level of private bargaining needed to reallocate use rights in this
fashion mushroomed as competitions for stream flow multiplied.253 Such large-scale
bargaining entailed high transaction costs.254 As Professor Rose asserts, the law’s
default rule of ownership accordingly shifted to a doctrine of reasonable use to
obviate the need for private agreements among competing owners, thus avoiding
many transaction costs.255 Accordingly, the riparian rights doctrine of reasonable use
permits junior users a quantum of use rights without the need for bargained-for
agreements among competing owners. Water rights thus relativized because
transaction costs precluded contractual limitation of absolute rights.
A similar pattern is present in the development of groundwater rights. In early
cases, like Acton v. Blundell, many courts adopted an absolute ownership rule—the
rule of capture. This absolute rule was the mirror image of the absolute rule of
natural flow doctrine; it permitted all extractions of groundwater regardless of
resulting disturbance. Absolute ownership was simpler and cheaper to administer
than a relative rights rule, especially given the lack of information available about
subterranean waters. 256 It was thought that the practical difficulties in determining
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agreements among all the owners along the stream.”). Morton Horwitz, in contrast, explains
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whether one owner’s subsurface activities affected another owner’s production of
groundwater would prohibit application of the reasonable use rule of riparian law.257
Despite its low administrative costs, the rule of absolute appropriation of
groundwater eventually proved untenable in arid American states, where
groundwater is finite, nonrenewable, and depletable.258 As demand for the resource
rose, the absolute rule compounded groundwater scarcity by permitting any single
owner to over-appropriate water from a common aquifer. Over-appropriation
lowered groundwater levels and increased costs of production to the exclusion of
other potential present and future users.259 The over-appropriation problem is most
pronounced in aquifers that recharge more slowly than they are produced, or where
production is akin to groundwater mining.
Relativizing the right to produce groundwater helped avoid or mitigate these
inefficiencies. Under a reasonable use or American rule approach, an owner may not
exclude other owners from a common aquifer by extracting excessive volumes, at
excessive rates, or for unreasonable purposes.260 The correlative rights approach
likewise limited an owner’s use of water, but on a strictly proportional basis.261
Under either approach, access to water rights is expanded beyond the first or biggest
appropriators. In this way, correlative or reasonable use rights served a similar
function in groundwater law as in riparian law.
Most western states, however, adopted prior appropriation doctrine rather than
correlative rights or reasonable use doctrine. These states, where surface water is
scarce and groundwater depletable, undertook the administrative and monitoring
costs to allocate individual property rights in water to appropriators based on the
extent of their beneficial use.262 Appropriation rights are generally absolute rather
than relative. While absolute, appropriation rights differ meaningfully from the sort
of first-stage absolute rights under Acton v. Blundell. Appropriation rights are
limited in certain respects, such as the quantity of water to be extracted and the
purpose and place of use of the water, whereas rights under the first-stage absolute
rule generally are not.263
What accounts for the move in western states from relative to limited absolute
appropriation rights? The answer has to do with how much water is available in the
257
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Budd, supra note 107, at 240–41.
258
See supra Part III.C.2.
259
See Clark, supra note 122, at 43 (noting that prior appropriation statutes “were
enacted to provide more rational methods of allocation and distribution so that more users in
the future will have a secure share in what amounts to the community’s whole future”).
260
See supra Part III.C.3.
261
See supra Part III.C.3.
262
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West and how it is used. Western states experience higher levels of water scarcity.
Drought and water shortages are more common. Moreover, uses of water in the West
tend to be consumptive (e.g., irrigation), whereas uses of water in the east generally
leave water in the same watercourse (e.g., waterpower generation).264 Finally,
groundwater is largely finite, nonrenewable, and depletable in western states. These
factors combine to generate more intense competition for groundwater resources in
western states. Prior appropriation doctrine responded by allocating precisely
defined absolute property rights that function more efficiently in times of scarcity
than relative rights, which require holders to share shortages.265 The additional
administrative and monitoring costs of prior appropriation regimes (over those of
reasonable use regimes) are justified by these efficiency advantages.
Yet, in the face of extensive permanent depletion of groundwater reserves,
some states passed legislation to relativize appropriation rights. In the wake of the
groundwater revolution, Colorado and Kansas, both prior appropriation states,
statutorily modified prior appropriation doctrine to permit “reasonable” impairment
of senior rights. Both states also deferred significant administrative control over
groundwater rights to local management bodies.266 Importantly, both Colorado and
Kansas have substantial water rights in the nonrenewable and depleting Ogallala
aquifer, in which rates of extraction exceed natural recharge.267 Thus, where
groundwater is so limited that extraction is tantamount to mining, rights may once
again relativize to permit group control, as they did in the second stage of riparian
law.
In oil and gas law, the Acton-style absolute rule of capture was originally
adopted as a convenient, low-administrative- and information-cost rule instead of a
rule of correlative rights.268 The rule of capture provided early courts an efficient
and wieldy alternative to allocating production among competing owners by placing
absolute title in the producer, regardless of how much is produced or from where in
the reservoir it is drained. Although the rule of capture was efficient in this sense,
nearly from its inception, the rule also produced multiple kinds of waste.269 Together
with the offset drilling corollary, the rule of capture incentivized overuse of the
surface of land for drilling and production facilities, overinvestment in drilling,
production of more oil than demand could soak up, and premature dissipation of
reservoir energy.270
Reservoir owners could contractually modify the rule of capture to avoid much
of this waste. They could voluntarily pool and unitize their various tracts to
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coordinate development of the reservoir and allocate the proceeds of production.271
The transaction costs of coordinating large groups of reservoir owners, however,
like coordinating large groups of riparian owners, are prohibitive.272 Against this
backdrop of waste and prohibitive transaction costs, the administrative and
information costs of a regime of limited rights appear justifiable.
Indeed, statutory conservation measures were developed to limit the absolute
regime to prevent waste and obviate total reliance on private bargaining.273
Generally, under such statutes, owners are limited in the number of wells they may
drill, and hydrocarbons they may produce, from a common reservoir,274 and any
single owner may petition to force other common owners into pooling or
unitization.275 Such production and spacing limitations turn the initial-stage absolute
rights that prevail under a pure rule of capture into something more akin to the
constrained version of absolute rights under prior appropriation doctrine.
Additionally, the common law doctrine of correlative rights developed weak
relative limitations on the absolute capture regime, based largely on a reasonable use
standard.276 Thus, oil and gas ownership rights began as absolute and then became
subject to constraints that both limited their scope and also, somewhat, made them
relative. In this sense, oil and gas rights loosely resemble groundwater rights in prior
appropriation states that permit reasonable impairment of senior rights in
nonrenewable aquifers.
To encapsulate the first lesson from the development of riparian, groundwater,
and oil and gas ownership regimes, absolute ownership rights yield to relative rights,
which sometimes yield again to limited absolute rights, as resource conditions
change. In the first stage of rights development, an absolute rights rule functions
well, and at a low cost, where the resource is plentiful. By placing title clearly in one
party—the first possessor—the absolute rule enables private bargaining to reallocate
rights in a given resource. Absolute rights begin to produce inefficient results and
become untenable, however, as demand for the resource increases and large numbers
of individuals seek access. While bargaining for access from holders of the initial
rights is possible, the transaction costs prove prohibitive. Moreover, the absolute
rights regime incentivizes overproduction of a resource without consideration of the
external effects on other common owners, leading to dissipation of the resource’s
ultimate economic value.
271
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In response to these problems, more or less, rights tend to become relative in a
second stage of development. Relative rights distribute initial entitlements among
all common owners, reducing the need for private transactions, and prohibit wasteful
production of the common pool. Where, however, the resource is critically scarce
and permanently depletable, as is the case for oil and gas as well as much
groundwater in the West, rights move on to a third stage of development. Here,
greater competitions for use lead to limited, but still absolute private property rights
in the resource. These rights nonetheless may become tinged with reasonableness
limitations—for example through the correlative rights doctrine of oil and gas or the
statutory modifications to prior appropriation doctrine—if depletion becomes severe
and irreversible. Thus, broadly summarized, the extent of rights in any given
semicommon natural resource is a function of the physical and economic conditions
surrounding the resource at a given time.
B. Lesson Two: Absolute Rights Are Limited and Relativized by Principles of
Nuisance
1. Nuisance as the Tort for Vindicating Relative Property Rights
It is one thing to say that property rights in a semicommons move between
absolute and relative roughly in response to changes in resource conditions, and
quite another to explain how this occurs doctrinally. In this section, I hope to
demonstrate that the “how” is the application and judicial modification of nuisance
law.
Nuisance doctrine has played an important role in remedying excessive use of
semicommon property since at least the days of Bracton.277 In the case of riparian
rights, from the medieval common law through Blackstone, nuisance was the cause
of action to vindicate interferences with rights in a watercourse. 278 The controlling
principle in riparian rights before Tyler v. Wilkinson—sic utere tuo—is a doctrine of
nuisance law and was first announced in a nuisance case.279 The reasonable use rule
of Tyler effectively applied precepts of nuisance to use of a common watercourse.280
These same precepts also form the foundation of reasonable use doctrine in
groundwater law.281 As detailed below, although oil and gas law has not explicitly
277
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acknowledged the role of nuisance in defining reservoir rights, nuisance principles
also underlie the doctrine of correlative rights.282 Nuisance principles of limited,
“reasonable,” use of property, therefore, appear to be the doctrinal mechanism for
limiting, and thereby relativizing, the extent of rights in semicommon property.283
Like trespass, nuisance is a tort whose application defines the extent of
property.284 Nuisance law derives from the principle, familiar to students of relative
rights, that every person has the right to use her land as she desires and the
corresponding duty not to make use of her land so as to interfere with the rights of
her neighbors.285 The provisions of nuisance law define when a particular
interference with use rights in property is unreasonable and thus actionable; nuisance
both determines the extent of relative rights in property and remedies violations of
those rights. The doctrine that discerns reasonable from unreasonable conduct to
impose liability for, and remedy violations of, property rights is inseparable from
the definition of the substantive rights themselves. Nuisance is to correlative rights
as trespass is to exclusive possessory rights.
Nuisance doctrine thus furnishes the analytical process by which courts
determine the extent of relative property interests in common pools.286 It is
unsurprising, then, that classic articulations of correlative rights doctrine mirror
descriptions of nuisance doctrine. Consider, for example, the echoes of nuisance
language in the following descriptions of correlative rights in oil and gas:
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Correlative rights refer to the “reciprocal rights and duties of the owners in
a common source of supply.”287
ii. Correlative rights arise where the use by one owner of his property in a
resource inherently affects the use of other owners of property in the same
resource. 288
iii. Correlative rights require owners to use their property reasonably, and
protect owners from the unreasonable use by others of their property.289
iv. Correlative rights doctrine is “[a]n analytical construct for defining” legally
acceptable use of property.290
v. Correlative rights is a “guide or precept [to ordering competing rights] that
is to be applied to particular facts.”291
vi. “Damages should be recoverable where a correlative right has been
invaded,” and the proper measure of damages may be diminution in property
value, lost profits and increased costs, or a participation formula if the loss
is the opportunity to participate in an enhanced recovery project.292 Each of
these is a variety of a traditional measure of nuisance damages.
Every one of these statements could be made about nuisance. Correlative rights
and nuisance are thus two sides of the same coin—the former, a description of the
substantive rights included in the property interest, and the latter, a tort protecting
those substantive rights from infringement.
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2. Nuisance and Relative Rights Turn on Defining Injuria and Laedas
Nuisance and doctrines of reasonable use and relative rights all proscribe the
use of property in a manner that injures another’s legal interest in related property.
Thus, when disputes arise among owners of common property, logically and
doctrinally the first issue is to define the parties’ respective property rights.293 As
experience in riparian, groundwater, and oil and gas disputes demonstrates,
however, defining property rights is difficult, even circular, when they are relative.
In a hypothetical two-party property dispute, the first step would be to
determine the extent of the defendant’s relative rights in the common property,
which are essentially limited by a rule of reasonable use. Yet, to determine whether
given conduct was either reasonable and nonactionable, or unreasonable and
actionable, one must first define the extent of the defendant’s positive (or
affirmative) rights. The problem is not solved by first determining the plaintiff’s
rights. The plaintiff has a negative (or passive) right to be free from unreasonable
interferences, but whether a given interference is unreasonable turns on whether it
violated the plaintiff’s negative right to be free from it. One must first know the
extent of the right to know whether it has been legally violated; yet, one must know
what will legally violate the right to know its extent.294
For the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurists that developed relative
rights,295 this circularity may have been a feature, more so than a bug, of the theory.
As Professor Jeff Lewin has illuminated, these courts operated under a natural rights
theory of property that, “[i]n contrast to the modern positivist conception, that [held]
the rights of private property owners were created by law . . . posit[ed] that property
rights existed prior to and independent of the legal and social system.”296 These
courts struggled to resolve the tension between the right of beneficial use and the
right against interference by others when they conflict, yet are both a priori rights.297
The relative rights theory accommodated this tension, without undermining
property’s natural law foundation, by defining relative property rights to include
only the right to reasonable use and the right to be free from another’s unreasonable
use. An unreasonable use of land was one that interfered with another’s reasonable
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use. With property rights so defined, there could never be a conflict between the
natural rights of two landowners.298
The circularity dilemma has dogged the definition of ownership in common
property since the time of Bracton, who himself struggled to distinguish damnum
from injuria.299 Damnum, or damage, means “actual harm,” whereas injuria, or legal
injury, refers to “an infringement, or violation, of a legal right of the plaintiff.”300 To
illustrate the difference between damnum and injuria, Bracton wrote that one who
“erects a mill on his own land and takes from his neighbor his own suit and that of
others . . . does his neighbor damage but no injuria since he is not prohibited by law
or a constitution from having or erecting a mill.”301 Likewise, it may be said that one
who drills an oil well on his own land and thereby takes oil from under his neighbor’s
land does his neighbor damage but no injuria, since he is privileged under the rule
of capture to drain oil from the common reservoir.
Starting in 1610 with William Aldred’s Case, courts applying sic utere tuo faced
the identical quandary in defining laedas, or harm. As noted in the riparian rights
discussion, some courts, including Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson, employed the
ambiguity in laedas to inject their own conceptions of utility and social good into
the property–tort analysis to resolve the circular impasse. Blackstone, and courts
influenced by his writings, took the approach on the opposite extreme. They
collapsed laedas and harm into functional synonyms, such that any harm (in the
colloquial sense) to a plaintiff’s established use of surface water constituted laedas
(“harm” in the legal sense).302
C. Lesson Three: Discerning Injuria and Laedas Comes Down to Instrumentalism
Versus Formalism
To escape the circularity dilemma, it is necessary to discern damnum from
injuria, and harm from laedas. As the models of semicommon property show, some
legal tests define legal injury by balancing the perceived social utility of the
defendant’s conduct with the harm done to the plaintiff’s property interest to reach
a desired result or achieve an instrumental purpose. Such instrumentalist tests
usually go by the name “reasonable use.” Some tests, on the other hand, apply a
formal definition of the extent of property rights, usually based on strict
proportionality, without reference to surrounding social context or instrumentalist
purposes.
298
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1. Instrumentalist “Reasonable Use” Standards
Defining property rights by a reasonable use standard is accomplished with
reference to the competing interests of the parties and the physical and social context
of the dispute. These tests generally proceed by balancing the relative utilities of the
party’s activities and their fit within the locality to subordinate one party’s rights to
another’s in order to maximize social good. Examples of this kind of test can be
found in Justice Story’s opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson;303 the reasonable use rule and
the Restatement’s provisions on groundwater law;304 Kuntz’s view of correlative
rights;305 and Pierce’s reservoir community analysis.306
The instrumentalist, or utilitarian, approach is also predominant in modern
nuisance law. Unable to define laedas or damnum with certainty, nineteenth-century
courts deciding nuisance cases increasingly relied on surrounding social context to
determine the property rights of the parties.307 As Bone notes, “[t]he fundamental
problem for the relative property rights model was how to defend a theory of the
property right derived from social context without positivizing the right.”308
According to Jeff Lewin, rejection of social determinism in the late nineteenthcentury made this task impossible, and legal positivism became the norm.309
Thereafter, courts began to more freely consider factors such as “the locality,” as
well as “the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff and the social value of the
defendant’s activity,” to determine the reasonableness of given conduct.310 The
positivist revolution in legal theory eventually culminated in the Restatement of
Torts and its balance-of-utilities test for nuisance.311
Utilitarian approaches to defining property rights have been criticized on
normative grounds. While the utilitarian approach may maximize efficient
production and use of property in any given case, it does so at the expense of
obscuring the definition of property rights. A common owner’s right is the result of
a utility-balancing analysis, rather than the starting point for application of tort law.
Consequently, when the extent of relative rights depends on each judge’s peculiar
concept of utility, property rights are unascertainable without litigation.312 Such a
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Bone, supra note 16, at 1214–15 (“The [New Hampshire Supreme] [C]ourt
frequently repeated the teaching of its early cases that what was reasonable could not be
ascertained in advance of particular cases and that reasonableness depended on the
conditions and circumstances of each social context.”); see Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 21
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view turns every nuisance action, in some sense, into a suit to quiet title. Defining
rights this way can have a destabilizing effect on property,313 which may discourage
public and private investment in resource development. Uncertainty has been said
to plague systems of riparian rights and reasonable use doctrine in groundwater
law.314
Defining rights by utility balancing entails yet another criticism. In
circumstances when the social utility of a defendant’s conduct is deemed to justify
the resulting interference with a plaintiff’s rights, the defendant is made, in effect,
an agent of the public. Yet, such a defendant “is entitled to do with absolute
impunity”—taking the property of another for a public purpose—that which the
public, acting through the state, “could do only upon the condition of [paying]
compensation.”315 The principal may not do through an agent (the defendant) what
it could not do itself directly.316 Thus, the crudest utilitarian definitions of property
rights may implicate constitutional prohibitions against uncompensated takings.317
2. Formalist Rules of Proportionality
Alternatively, it is possible to precisely define injuria and laedas by
establishing, ex ante, a determinate definition of correlative rights, with minimum
reference to social context, and by imposing liability ex post for any violation of the
rights so defined. In water law, the correlative rights rule accomplishes this by
allocating to each common owner a share of groundwater strictly in proportion to
the surface area of the owner’s land.318 This approach undergirds the allocation
prong of Summers’s definition of correlative rights.319 Blackstone’s application of
N.E. 230, 231 (Mass. 1889) (“The respective rights and liabilities of adjoining land-owners
cannot be determined in advance by a mathematical line, or a general formula . . .”).
313
Halper, supra note 301, at 306 (noting that Gilded Age courts approaching nuisance
attempted to avoid “strict utilitarianism which carried a dangerously destabilizing attitude
toward private property”). Additionally, Professor Richard Epstein blames utilitarian
variants of nuisance law for the doctrine’s reputation for intellectual incoherence. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS, supra note 284, at 115.
314
See Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 304 (“Analysts of riparian rights often conclude
that the application of riparian rights produces such uncertainty and even confusion as to
impede the settlement of problems arising during severe water shortages, to leave significant
public interests unprotected, and to discourage public or private investment in water
development.”).
315
Smith, supra note 76, at 393–94.
316
See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting) (stating that in private nuisance, injunctive relief is preferred because the
common law does not countenance the private right of eminent domain).
317
See generally Stop the Beach Nourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot., 560
U.S. 702 (2010) (considering judicial takings claims based on modifications to property
doctrine).
318
See supra Part III.C.3.
319
See supra Part III.D.2.(a).
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sic utere tuo and the modern prior appropriation doctrine exemplify another type of
formalist approach. Under these doctrines, once established by prior appropriation,
a party’s water right is inviolable. Thus, the extent of a water right is defined strictly
as the extent of the first appropriation.320 All such formalist approaches define
property rights more or less categorically.
Although formalist rules provide a measure of certainty by starkly defining
property rights, they can lead to harsh or unjust results in close cases.321 Critics of
the strictly proportional correlative rights doctrine in groundwater law further argue
that the rule incentivizes strategic behavior among landowners.322 For instance, in
correlative rights doctrine states like California, groundwater users have strong
incentives to pump as much as possible to establish a prescriptive right to a greater
proportion of groundwater than their land holdings initially justify. Waste thus
“becomes a means for capturing future rents for the water pumped now,” and the
result may be a version of the tragedy of the commons.323
Additionally, formalist rules may proscribe socially beneficial conduct, like
massive hydraulic fracturing or carbon storage projects, which may be privileged
under a reasonable use standard. Reservoir owners would be free to cooperate in
such operations by transferring or consolidating their respective, clearly defined,
reservoir rights. However, experience teaches that transaction costs often prove
prohibitive.324 Formalist approaches may, therefore, provide certainty at the expense
of development.
***
The instrumentalist and formalist approaches represent two different
resolutions to the “on-going tension between encouraging development and
protecting private property.”325 In selecting one or the other scheme, one must
choose, to some extent, between promoting resource use and certainty in property
rights. While it is possible in theory to derive a perfectly fluid and flexible utilitarian
or purely formalist system of nuisance or correlative rights, in practice neither such
320

See supra Part.B.2 (discussing Blackstone’s theory) and Part III.C.4 (discussing
modern prior appropriation doctrine).
321
See EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 284, at 118 (“So long as we are sure that the vast
bulk of the cases falls clearly on one side of the line or the other, we can easily tolerate some
ambiguity at the margins: litigation exerts powerful forces to select the most difficult cases
for adjudication, no matter what the underlying standard.”).
322
Dellapenna, supra note 106, at 279 (“In actual practice, [correlative rights] provide
incentives for problematic behavior and create uncertainty.”).
323
Id.
324
See Rose, Common-Law Water Rights, supra note 68, at 270–72 (discussing
transaction costs associated with large-scale bargaining among numerous riparian owners).
325
Halper, supra note 301, at 328 (noting the “on-going tension between encouraging
development and protecting private property. When the pendulum swings too far in one
direction, it is certain to swing eventually too far in the other direction”).
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system is workable. As Professor Richard Epstein teaches, even a perfectly
formalist, or “corrective justice,” theory of nuisance must yield to certain utilitarian
constraints.326 Properly viewed, therefore, the choice is not between fluidity and
certainty, but rather where on the spectrum running from absolute fluidity and
absolute certainty to ideally locate a rule for defining the extent of property rights in
a semicommons.327
V. APPLYING THE LESSONS TO SYNTHESIZE A DOCTRINE OF PORE SPACE
PROPERTY
A. Pore Space Property Is in an Absolute Stage of Development, But a Relative
Stage Is Around the Corner
1. Pore Space Rights Are Currently Absolute and Determined by a Rule
of First Use
Pore space law currently resembles the absolutist prior appropriation doctrine
of Blackstone, but lacks the limitations imposed by modern prior appropriation
regimes.328 In this sense, pore space rights fall within the first stage of development
identified in the models of semicommon property. In general, one who injects into
pore space for purposes of waste disposal, secondary or enhanced oil recovery,
natural gas storage, hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, or the like is free from
liability for encroaching under the land of another, unless the injection interferes
with another owner’s prior-established use of the pore space. Once an injector
establishes such a right by using unoccupied pore space, later injectors will be liable
for any substantial interference.
Consequently, pore space rights are not determined by a strict rule of capture,
which would permit interference with preexisting uses. Instead, regardless of where
within the common reservoir the pore space is located, in pore space cases the first
user of pore space wins. Pore space rights are thus established by first use and are
absolute. In this sense, pore space rights somewhat resemble appropriation rights
under Blackstone’s prior appropriation doctrine.
Other work has systematically reviewed the case law on intra-reservoir
property disputes.329 It has been observed that many of the cases in this area are
“neither unified nor coherent.”330 However, Professor Anderson’s study of the cases
shows that a consensus of courts do not consider injection of material into the
326

Epstein, Nuisance Law, supra note 284, at 73.
See Smith, Governing Water, supra note 168, at 448 (noting that property rights in
fugitive resources tend to include a little exclusion and increasing amounts of governance).
328
See supra Part III.B.3–4, C.4.
329
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 44, at 255–81; Anderson, Lord Coke, supra note
213; Schremmer, supra note 5, at 342–73.
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Anderson, supra note 44, at 255.
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subsurface underlying another’s land to be actionable, unless it results in actual and
substantial property damage.331 Consider a leading and emblematic case, Chance v.
BP Chemicals, Inc.332 Plaintiff landowners sued BP for trespass, claiming BP had
injected fluid waste into a common saline aquifer that then migrated into portions of
the aquifer underlying their land.333 The Ohio Supreme Court held BP free from
liability because the plaintiffs failed to show the injected waste physically damaged
or interfered with the plaintiffs’ preexisting or foreseeable uses of the subsurface.334
Because the plaintiffs had not established a prior use of the pore space
underlying their land, BP was privileged to use it without paying compensation.
Hypothetically, under the same rule, if the plaintiffs were to later start injecting into
the same saline aquifer and impede BP’s injection operation, BP would have a viable
claim for damages for interference with its existing use. Echoing the concerns of
early courts in groundwater and oil and gas cases, Chance acknowledged that this
result was justified, in part, by its lack of knowledge about the migration of the
injected fluids. Despite complex fluid migration models offered by the plaintiffs, the
court remained uncertain whether BP’s injectate in fact invaded the plaintiffs’
subsurface.335 Other courts have likewise acknowledged the difficulty in
determining the migration of fluids through subsurface pore space.336
As Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC,337 discussed above,338
demonstrates, the first-to-use principle extends beyond using common pore space
for fluid disposal. The Texas Supreme Court denied Lightning Oil’s request for an
injunction against Anadarko because it failed to show Anadarko’s proposed
wellbores would interfere with Lightning Oil’s existing or foreseeable development

331

See id. at 258–81 (reviewing cases involving property disputes from hydraulic
fracturing, horizontal drilling, waste disposal, enhanced oil recovery, and natural gas storage
operations).
332
Chance v. BP Chems., Inc.670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996).
333
Id. at 986.
334
Id. at 992–93.
335
Id. at 993 (“All of these and more disputed variables went into the construction of
the hypothetical models that attempted to illustrate the lateral extent of the migration. Given
all these variables, there were great difficulties in appellants’ establishing, as a factual matter,
that a property invasion had occurred, so that appellants’ claim must be regarded as
somewhat speculative.”).
336
See, e.g., Hill v. Sw. Energy Co., 858 F.3d 481, 485–87 (8th Cir. 2017) (reviewing
district court’s exclusion of expert testimony pertaining to the spread of injected “fracking
waste”); Raymond v. Union Tex. Petroleum Corp., 697 F. Supp. 270, n.7 (E.D. La. 1988)
(“Considering the expert testimony in this case regarding the uncertainty of determining if,
when, and where injected salt water might migrate, it is unlikely that an operator would
undertake to execute leases with all landowners under whose property injected salt water
might migrate.”).
337
Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017).
338
See supra text accompanying notes 288–33.
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of the mineral estate.339 Just as in Chance, superior rights to the pore space were
given to the first user (here, Anadarko).
A first-use rule also appeared to be at work in the hydraulic fracturing context
in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust.340 As discussed above,341
Coastal’s hydraulic fractures into the Salinas parties’ subsurface pore space were
held not actionable because they did not physically damage the Salinas parties’ land
or existing subsurface operations.342 Notably, the record in Garza contained
conflicting expert testimony on the extent of the fractures under the Salinas parties’
land.343 The fact that the invasion occurred two miles underground, where even
expert knowledge is uncertain, appeared to weigh in the court’s reasoning. In one
frequently quoted passage, the majority opinion remarks, “The law of trespass need
no more be the same two miles below the surface than two miles above.”344
The themes identified in the foregoing cases are readily apparent in many others
involving injection into pore space for disposal, storage, enhanced recovery,
hydraulic fracturing, and horizontal drilling. Rights to pore space are established on
a rough rule of first use and, once established, are entitled to be free from
interference. Courts justify this approach, in part, on the lack of knowledge about
fluid migration in the deep subsurface and the attendant costs of proving and
remedying invasions.345 In this way, pore space rights appear to be in an absolute
stage of development of semicommons.346
2. To Avoid Waste, Absolute Pore Space Rights Will Eventually Yield
to Relative Rights
The influences that led courts to limit absolute rights in water and oil and gas
are also likely to emerge in the context of pore space. In general, when competition
339

Lightning Oil Co., 520 S.W.3d at 49. As a mineral lessee, Lightning Oil’s interest
in the subsurface included merely the opportunity to produce the oil and gas contained within
subsurface pore space underlying its lease premises. Id.
340
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. 2008).
341
See supra text accompanying notes 226–27.
342
See supra notes and text accompanying notes 224–25.
343
See Garza, 268 S.W.3d at 44 (Johnson, J. concurring) (“Coastal’s expert testified
that the effective length of the fractures (that length through which gas will flow) did not
extend into Share 13, while Salinas’s expert opined that it did.”).
344
Id. at 11. In another case alleging trespass by hydraulic fracturing, Briggs v.
Southwestern Energy Production Company, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania likewise
noted, “[t]he judiciary . . . lacks institutional tools necessary to investigate the continuing
feasibility of self-help remedies under the myriad of circumstances that may present
themselves in the context of a dispute such as this one.” Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co. 224
A.3d 334, 348 (Pa. 2020).
345
Determining whether an injected substance has migrated beyond the boundaries of
the injector’s tract is a category of information cost. See Smith, Governing Water, supra note
168, at 446 (defining information costs in governing fluid property rights).
346
See supra Part IV.A. (discussing the first stage of development).
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for a resource increases, the inefficiencies produced by a regime of absolute rights
eventually militate toward a regime of relative rights in which more holders are
entitled to use the resource at lower levels of intensity.347 Broadly, these
inefficiencies include various forms of waste (economic, surface, underground, etc.)
as a result of excessive use of the resource, and transaction costs that prohibit
contractual coordination of resource development among numerous common
owners.348
The forces that lead to relativized rights tend to arise when competition for the
resource becomes intense. The precise level of competition, and thus of scarcity, at
which rights in semicommon resources start to become limited and relative is not
clear.349 Although it is difficult to predict when it may occur, the costs of the absolute
first-use rule of pore space rights are likely to overwhelm its administrative
efficiencies, just as occurred in the development of water and oil and gas rights. At
some point, the first-use rule currently governing pore space rights will lead to waste
of pore space capacity, which will not be remediable by private agreement because
of high transaction costs. The only question is when the turning point will occur.
Recent developments suggest that pore space scarcity may be on the horizon.
The use of pore space for temporary and permanent storage of various substances is
rising. Pore space capacity is increasingly used for temporary storage of compressed
air as a form of energy in a technique called compressed air energy storage
(CAES).350 Similarly, technology enables storage of water in aquifer pore space for
later retrieval in aquifer storage and retrieval (ASR).351 Carbon capture and storage
(CCS) garners increasing attention from policy-makers and private actors interested
in injecting anthropogenic carbon dioxide into deep pore space for permanent
storage to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.352 In 2018, the President signed into
law a federal investment tax credit incentivizing large-scale geologic carbon dioxide
sequestration.353 The United States Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy,
has funded—to the tune of nearly $100 million—several research and development
projects intended to demonstrate the feasibility of commercial-scale carbon storage
across the country.354
347

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
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See generally MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROY A. PARTAIN, CARBON CAPTURE AND
STORAGE: EFFICIENT LEGAL POLICIES FOR RISK GOVERNANCE AND COMPENSATION (2017)
(discussing carbon storage technology as well as its significant legal, regulatory, and public
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See 26 U.S.C. § 45Q (Supp. 2018) (Discussing the credit for carbon dioxide
sequestration).
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY.GOV, DOE Announces $68.4
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In addition to these cutting-edge pore space uses, traditional pore space
activities appear to be growing. Pore space has long been used as an underground
landfill for fluid waste. Under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act,355 many kinds
of fluid waste, including hazardous wastes, are injected for disposal in deep pore
space. The largest of these wastes by volume is produced water, which is the
saltwater commingled with extracted oil and natural gas.356 While produced water
has long been injected for disposal, in parts of the country experiencing significant
oil and gas production, disposal volumes have spiked to critical levels. In the
Permian Basin, for instance, volumes of produced water are mushrooming as a result
of unconventional production techniques like so-called batch drilling and “zipper
fracs.”357
Disposal capacity for produced water is struggling to keep up with demand.358
In areas of high injection activity, pressures from injection wells are even causing
the casing in producing oil and gas wells to collapse.359 Additionally, high-volume
water injection has been linked to induced earthquakes in Oklahoma, Kansas, Texas,

https://www.energy.gov/fe/articles/doe-announces-684-million-funding-advance-safe-andpermanent-storage-co2 [https://perma.cc/B4YC-X5PV]; Alvina Board, IEA Clean Coal
Centre, USA, Energy Department Selects Additional Carbon Storage Feasibility Projects to
Receive Nearly $30M in Federal Funding (May 30, 2018), https://www.iea-coal.org/usaenergy-department-selects-additional-carbon-storage-feasibility-projects-to-receive-nearly30m-in-federal-funding/ [https://perma.cc/V6QW-PBW2].
355
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (Supp. 2018).
356
See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Env’t. Prot. Agency, 863 F.2d 1420, 1425
(9th Cir. 1988) (discussing and defining produced water).
357
See Sergio Chapa, Permian Basin Water Disposal Volumes Expected to Double by
2022, HOUSTON CHRONICAL (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/
energy/article/Permian-Basin-water-disposal-volumes-expected-to-13765666.php? [https://
perma.cc/CQ34-5CDQ]; Wire Services, ‘Disposal Nightmare’: In Permian Basin, Every
Barrel of Oil Means Four Barrels of Toxic Water, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 29, 2018),
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/energy/2018/08/29/disposal-nightmare-in-permianbasin-every-barrel-of-oil-means-four-barrels-of-toxic-water/ [https://perma.cc/8P2T-2JCH]
[hereinafter Disposal Nightmare]; Hell or High Water in the Permian Basin? Will Water Be
the Industry’s Next Bottleneck?, WOOD MACKENZIE (last accessed June 30, 2020),
https://www.woodmac.com/news/feature/hell-or-high-water/
[https://perma.cc/HH5FEYT3] [hereinafter Hell or High Water]; See also Velda Addison, Shale Operators Aim to
Tame Water Woes in Permian Basin, HART ENERGY (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.hartenergy.
com/exclusives/shale-operators-aim-tame-water-woes-permian-basin-177907 [https://perm
a.cc/KMA6-LWTE].
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Hell or High Water, supra note 357 (“The number of completed Permian wells
continues to increase, and water disposal volumes are forecast to double by 2022 . . . . This
produces increasingly large volumes of water. Even with 100% water reuse for completions,
which is unlikely, the current salt water disposal infrastructure is expected to hit capacity in
the near future.”).
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Disposal Nightmare, supra note 357.
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Arkansas, Ohio, and New Mexico.360 State conservation agencies have responded
by stinting injection volumes in permitted wells, thereby limiting use of the pore
space.361 Moreover, in what appears to be a first-of-its-kind policy, the State Land
Office of New Mexico now protests applications for authority to inject produced
water into wells that are near state-owned lands. The practice is a means of requiring
compensation for occupation of its pore space by injected produced water.362
Individually, these factors do not amount to a critical level of scarcity, but
together, and over time, they may well result in greater demands for pore space
capacity. As demand increases, so too does the risk of overexploitation incentivized
by the absolute rule of first use. If the analogy to water and oil and gas law holds,
the resulting waste will likely be difficult or impossible for private reservoir owners
to address contractually.363 Absent legislative intervention, like was seen in the
history of oil and gas law and prior appropriation of groundwater, the common law’s
likely response will be to refine pore space rights established by prior use into
relative rights.
It is somewhat beyond the reach of this Article to predict whether pore space
rights will someday reach a third stage of development. However, it follows from
the foregoing study of groundwater and oil and gas rights that the question of
whether strictly limited but absolute rights to use pore space will develop statutorily
or doctrinally will depend on how scarce and valuable pore space becomes and
whether the costs of administering and monitoring such a regime would be
worthwhile.
B. Limits on Pore Space Rights Will Develop Through Nuisance Doctrine
As the models of semicommon property demonstrate, the mechanism by which
rights in common pool natural resources are limited and relativized is the tort of
360
See Monika U. Ehrman, Earthquakes in the Oilpatch: The Regulatory and Legal
Issues Arising Out of Oil and Gas Operation Induced Seismicity, 33 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 609,
611–13 (2017) (discussing issues of induced earthquake activity in Texas, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Arkansas, and Ohio); see also Disposal Nightmare, supra note 357 (discussing
earthquake problems in Texas and New Mexico as a result of development in the Permian
Basin).
361
See Ehrman, supra note 360, at 637–45 (surveying state regulatory responses to
concerns about induced seismicity from oil and gas and produced water disposal operations).
362
Joseph Schremmer, Crystal Gazing: Foretelling the Next Decade in Oil and Gas
Law, 66 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 74–77) (on file with
author); Ari Biernoff, Presentation at the State Bar of New Mexico Oil and Gas Law in New
Mexico CLE: What’s New at the State Land Office in Oil & Gas (Dec. 4, 2019) (presentation
by General Counsel, New Mexico State Land Office, 2019).
363
See supra Part IV.A (discussing the problem of high transaction costs when many
owners hold an interest in semicommon property). In the case of using pore space for carbon
dioxide storage, some states have addressed this problem by passing statutes to unitize pore
space rights. Righetti, supra note 2, at 10436.
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nuisance. Even where nuisance is not expressly acknowledged as the limiting
mechanism, as in oil and gas law’s correlative rights doctrine and the reasonable use
rule in water law, nuisance’s principles for ordering competing uses of related
property are clearly at work when rights relativize.364
In fact, nuisance concepts already underlie existing case law dealing with
subsurface property rights.365 When a landowner sues for invasion of the subsurface
of its land by foreign material, lawyers and judges typically frame the dispute as an
alleged trespass.366 Notwithstanding this label, courts tend to eschew the rules and
remedies traditionally associated with trespass in favor of more malleable
provisions. While traditional trespass presumes damage by the mere fact of
unauthorized encroachment, subsurface trespass cases usually require a showing of
actual damage to establish liability.367 Even where an invasion is indisputably
established, courts are wont to balance the severity of the harm sustained by the
plaintiff with the societal good accomplished by the offending activity to determine
liability.368 Further, where liability is found for a subsurface invasion, the usual
trespass remedies of ejectment and nominal damages are discarded, and only
compensatory damages are awarded.369
Such departures from the traditional tort of trespass reveal the nature of
subsurface property as nonpossessory. The strict, possession-protecting provisions
of trespass lead to absurd results when faithfully applied to subsurface
encroachments because the nature of interconnected rock structures—and their
interstitial pore spaces—is nonexcludable (nonpossessory, in legal jargon).370
Nuisance’s use-protecting provisions instead are apposite when disputes arise over
excessive use of a common pool resource.
As currently applied in subsurface-use disputes, however, nuisance principles
tend to define injuria or laedas to include only actual damage to preexisting
subsurface activities, thus resulting in a kind of absolute property right.371 This is
similar to how Blackstone applied nuisance law’s sic utere tuo to protect priorestablished uses of water from any and all interference.372 To limit, or relativize,
pore space rights, courts would need to redefine legal injury (and, therefore, the
extent of the property right) to encompass a broader set of harms than merely actual
damage to established subsurface activities. Defining legal injury is the crux of
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governing a semicommons and, as the semicommons models illustrate, doing so
ultimately requires balancing certainty with flexibility.373
C. Defining the Extent of Pore Space Rights by Reasonableness, Proportionality,
and Otherwise
Above, I discussed the dominant methods of delineating relative rights in
common pool natural resources: instrumentalist reasonableness standards and
formalist rules of strict proportionality.374 An instrumentalist reasonableness method
underpins modern riparian rights doctrine, the reasonable use rule in groundwater,
and Professors Kuntz’s and Pierce’s definitions of correlative rights in oil and gas
law.375 Groundwater law’s correlative rights doctrine and Professor Summers’s
theory of oil and gas rights adopt a formalist, proportional method of defining
relative rights.376 In this section, I will briefly consider how each method could be
applied to define pore space rights, and suggest a third method, synthesized from
principles of oil and gas correlative rights, which may promote certainty while
accommodating unavoidable utilitarian constraints.
1. A Reasonable Use Definition of Pore Space Rights
Defining rights to use pore space based on a rule of reasonable use would
resemble Professor Pierce’s reservoir community analysis,377 which, in turn,
somewhat resembles the Restatement’s tests for nuisance378 and excessive use of
surface and groundwater resources.379 Under reservoir community analysis, defining
pore space use rights would proceed case by case based on the physical attributes of
the common reservoir, the suitability of the competing pore space uses to the
reservoir, and whether the invading activity is necessary to maximize the value of
the reservoir’s pore space capacity. Similarly, under the Restatement’s balance of
utilities test for nuisance and its test for liability for overuse of water, pore space
rights would be defined, in broad terms, by balancing the utility of the invading pore
space use with the gravity of harm to the invaded interest.380
As conceived by Professor Pierce, the reservoir community analysis is
concerned with maximizing efficient production of oil and gas from common
373
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reservoirs. Pierce has amply demonstrated how the analysis would apply to disputes
arising over activities intended to produce oil and gas, like horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing.381 In oil and gas production, there is a single purpose: maximize
ultimate recovery of the resource. The value of any given production technique is
thus determinable with reference to its ability to maximize production.
Pore space, on the other hand, can serve many functions that are not directly
related to oil and gas production, or any other single purpose, such as waste disposal,
carbon storage, and energy storage. Applying the analysis to the use of pore space
for such non-extractive injection activities is more difficult, because the purposes
and values of each activity are different and incommensurable with each other. To
account for the incommensurability problem, the reservoir community analysis
would need to consider the utility of the injection activity more broadly than merely
whether it maximizes oil and gas production. Ultimately, this may require
prioritizing certain types of pore space uses, much as some jurisdictions prioritize
domestic and agricultural uses of water in applying the reasonable use test of riparian
and groundwater law.382
To illustrate the incommensurability problem, suppose A and B own separate
tracts of land overlying the Entrada Sandstone reservoir. A obtained a permit to inject
carbon dioxide into the Entrada Sandstone for geologic storage. When offered a fair
chance to participate in the carbon dioxide storage project by A, B refused. B
objected to the storage project because it would interfere with B’s existing saltwater
injection well, which disposes of water produced from B’s natural gas well into the
Entrada Sandstone formation. Notwithstanding B’s objection, A began construction
of its carbon dioxide injection well, and B sued to enjoin further operations, alleging
imminent interference with its disposal operations.
Applying a reservoir community analysis to these hypothetical facts, a court
would proceed in three steps.383 First, it would determine A’s and B’s “membership”
in the “reservoir community” based on their owning land overlying a portion of the
common reservoir. Second, the court would consider the geological and geophysical
evidence to determine relevant reservoir conditions, such as porosity, permeability,
and pressure, with the goal of evaluating the suitability of the reservoir for carbon
storage and saltwater disposal. Third, the court would evaluate A’s intended use of
the pore space for carbon storage and B’s existing use of the pore space for produced
water disposal with reference to the Entrada Sandstone’s physical character.
If it turns out that the Entrada Sandstone is equally suitable for both carbon
storage and saltwater disposal, it will be difficult to determine which competing
activity maximizes the value of the pore space, because “value” is measured
differently for each activity. What should be the measure of value—the net present
value of the revenue from each activity, the anticipated return on investment of each,
the capital outlay required for each, the social good each activity produces, or the
381
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value of each activity to its respective user? Some courts in this situation might
determine that the social value of A’s carbon storage project justifies the harm to B’s
saltwater disposal operations. Perhaps other courts may strike the balance in favor
of B, because to condemn the produced water disposal would force B to plug and
abandon its natural gas well, resulting in the waste of natural gas.
Until the matter is litigated and decided by a court, neither A nor B can be
confident of the result. Such is also a problem in the application of water law’s
reasonable use rule and the Restatement’s version of utility-balancing nuisance
doctrine.384 Thus, while a utilitarian, reasonable use approach may maximize the
value of pore space capacity in any given case (assuming a commensurable measure
of “value”), it may do so at the expense of clearly defining property rights.
Obscuring the definition of property rights may, in turn, undermine investment in
the development of pore space activities.385
2. A Strictly Proportional Definition of Pore Space Rights
A strictly proportional definition of pore space rights is easy to conceptualize,
but difficult to apply in practice. In groundwater law, the correlative rights doctrine
defines owners’ rights in a common groundwater aquifer on the basis of the acreage
of their land holdings overlying the aquifer.386 Professor Summers proposed a
definition of correlative rights in oil and gas reservoirs based on the same kind of
allocation.387 In groundwater law, the proportional correlative rights doctrine was
not widely adopted.388 The allocation prong of Professor Summers’s definition of
correlative rights also was not widely adopted.389 For the reasons explained below,
a strict-proportional allocation of pore space rights would likely suffer from the same
impediments to widespread adoption.
Professor Tara Righetti has favorably discussed a proportional rule for
allocating pore space rights for carbon dioxide storage. Righetti asserts that a
proportional rule would clearly delineate parties’ rights to inject carbon for storage
into common pore space, and thus enable private bargaining and cooperation to
consolidate rights for field-wide storage operations.390 Righetti implicitly
acknowledges that the transaction costs associated with such large-numbers of
transactions are generally prohibitive, and accordingly indicates that a proportional384
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use rule would require administration by a state regulatory agency.391 In fact, some
states have adopted legislation providing for the unitization of pore space rights for
carbon storage.392 Experience in oil and gas demonstrates that administrative
regulation is indeed necessary where rights in a common reservoir are broadly
distributed among many holders, because the problems of transaction costs and
holdouts impede efficient development of the entire reservoir.393
The administrative and information costs of a formalist, proportional scheme
of pore space rights administered by a regulatory agency would be significant.
Righetti acknowledges that, given the technical complexity of delineating reservoir
pore space capacity underlying any given tract of land, using surface acreage as a
proxy for determining proportionality may not be an ideal mechanism for pore
space.394 As Professor Clyde Martz noted half a century ago about groundwater
law’s correlative rights doctrine, the significant administrative cost of proportional
allocation may overwhelm the benefits.395
Further, where statutory administrative regimes are not adopted, defining pore
space rights on a strictly proportional basis may invite strategic behavior among pore
space owners. In California, which follows a strictly proportional variety of
correlative rights doctrine for groundwater, groundwater rights holders intentionally
over-pump aquifers to establish prescriptive rights to more than their proportional
allocation of the common groundwater.396 The result is a tragedy of the commons in
which users are able to internalize the benefits and externalize the costs of overappropriation to other users.397 In sum, a formalist, proportional definition of pore
space rights has conceptual allure; however, in application it generally requires
administrative regulation, is expensive to administer, and may incentivize strategic
behavior among common owners.
3. A Third Method? Defining Pore Space Rights Based on the Fair-Opportunity
Principle
The models of semicommon property demonstrate, to varying degrees, the
difficulties in defining rights by either an instrumentalist reasonable use standard or
a formalist rule of proportionality. As detailed in the preceding sections, these
difficulties inhere equally in defining rights in pore space. The dilemma may
ultimately be resolved by statutory schemes, which themselves would need to
391
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grapple with the tradeoffs between fluidity and certainty. There is no perfect
solution. It is possible, however, to derive from the models a definition of reservoir
pore space rights that is relatively flexible without being indeterminate, and
relatively certain without being prohibitively costly to administer.
Professor Righetti demonstrated how a rule allocating pore space rights
proportionally would function.398 Yet, at least in the oil and gas context, correlative
rights are both more and less than the right to produce a proportional amount of the
contents of a common reservoir. Correlative rights are less in that they entitle holders
only to the fair opportunity to produce a proportional share of reserves, and not to a
guaranteed portion of production or its value.399 Correlative rights may also entitle
holders to more than merely their proportional share of reserves, since active holders
may produce a disproportionate share if other holders do not exercise their
opportunity to produce. This fair-opportunity principle from oil and gas doctrine
furnishes a limitation on the absolute rule of capture that is more flexible than strict
proportionality, yet does not rely as heavily on judicial discretion as would a
reasonable use limitation. As discussed above, similar limiting principles are applied
in fluid injection cases under Oklahoma and Arkansas law.400
Briefly, under Oklahoma’s modified doctrine of private nuisance, injectors are
liable for interfering with the lawful preexisting reservoir activities of other reservoir
owners.401 Injectors are not liable for merely occupying the pore space underlying
another owner’s property, so long as it would not prevent the owner from using the
formation for like operations.402 Oklahoma’s nuisance doctrine does not consider the
utility of the defendant’s injection operations, whether they have been authorized by
a regulatory agency, or the nature of the locality.403 Arkansas courts privilege
invasions of fluid injected for enhanced recovery in situations where the plaintiff,
despite the invasion, has the self-help ability to conduct like operations.404 Where
the invasion would prevent the plaintiff from doing likewise, on the other hand,
Arkansas courts have held the injector liable for the value of minerals extracted from
the plaintiff’s tract in excess of natural depletion.405
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Other courts privilege fluid invasions caused by enhanced recovery operations
that the plaintiff refused a fair opportunity to join consensually.406 Thus, as in
Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp.,407 even if a defendant’s waterflood operation
precludes a plaintiff from developing the reserves under her tract, the plaintiff cannot
sue for trespass and drainage damages if he previously refused an offer to participate
in the operation on the same terms as similarly situated reservoir owners. In
circumstances like these, the plaintiff’s correlative rights entitle him only to a fair
opportunity to participate in the defendant’s reservoir-wide operation, which he
received and declined to exercise.408
These principles can be synthesized into a “fair-opportunity doctrine” to define
the extent of property rights in common pore space, including rights to use pore
space for all manner of disposal and storage.409 The synthesized doctrine could also
be applied to define rights to conduct secondary and enhanced recovery operations,
hydraulic fracturing, and horizontal drilling for oil and gas production in common
reservoirs.
The fair-opportunity doctrine permits an owner to use shared pore space for any
activity, so long as it does not interfere with the lawful existing operations of other
owners, or deprive other owners of a fair opportunity to conduct like operations from
their respective land or participate in the proposed operations. In effect, the doctrine
grants pore space owners an incomplete privilege410 to use a disproportionate
quantity of pore space anywhere within a reservoir, provided they offer a fair
opportunity to participate in the benefits and burdens of the operation to any and all
common owners whose appurtenant pore space may be condemned for further use
by the operation.
According to the doctrine, an owner is liable for use of pore space in a common
reservoir only when (1) the defendant by an affirmative act (2) physically invades
406
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the boundaries of the plaintiff’s subsurface as defined by the ad coelum doctrine, (3)
and damages the plaintiff by impairing either the plaintiff’s (a) existing lawful use
of the reservoir pore space or (b) fair opportunity to lawfully use the reservoir pore
space. The fair-opportunity principle is incorporated into the test via element
(3)(b)—the plaintiff’s fair opportunity to lawfully use the reservoir. Essentially,
element (3)(b) prohibits destruction of the reservoir, waste of its resources, or
occupation of it to the total exclusion of other reservoir owners. Element (3)(b) is
not met where a plaintiff declined the fair opportunity to participate on equivalent
terms as other similarly situated owners in a defendant’s proposed reservoir-wide
operation (e.g., an enhanced recovery or carbon storage project). The plaintiff in
such a case would be deemed to have exercised her fair opportunity to use the
reservoir by declining such an offer to participate.
Just as each owner in a common pool is entitled to a fair opportunity to obtain
the value of the oil or gas recoverable from its portion of the reservoir, each owner
is entitled to a fair opportunity to obtain the use value of its portion of the reservoir’s
storage capacity. The only conceptual difference is in valuing the resource. In
contrast to the value of pore space, the value of oil and gas is easily determined
because there are established markets for the products. Nevertheless, the value of
the pore space may be extrapolated from the amount of compensation, if any, paid
to the owner of the pore space at the injection site for the storage rights.
If, as is typical, none or only a small portion of the compensation paid to the
injection site owner is attributable to the use of pore space,411 a plaintiff would need
to establish some other method of valuing the pore space capacity to be entitled to
market value damages. If a plaintiff cannot prove a market value for the pore space
or show other losses, she cannot satisfy the damage requirement and cannot establish
liability under this (or any other) test for nontrespassory invasions. In such a case,
nothing of value was lost by the plaintiff or taken by the defendant, and
compensation would be inappropriate.
The fair-opportunity doctrine limits absolute rights in shared pore space
capacity in a principled, reasonably predictable manner that neither invites
significant judicial discretion nor requires excessive administrative or information
costs. Information and transaction costs are unavoidable, but this framework
minimizes them. The information needed by the court to resolve the dispute is not
each tract owner’s proportionate share of the total reservoir pore space, but merely
whether any owner’s pore space activity precludes the other from doing the same in
the reservoir.
Moreover, the fair-opportunity doctrine more clearly allocates initial property
rights than a reasonable use standard and thus enables parties to more easily govern
their behavior and exchange property rights consensually ex ante to avoid disputes.
Transaction costs are reduced (though not eliminated) because only a fair offer is
411
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required, not the consummation of a fair deal. Prior-established users are prevented
from holding out and rent seeking by virtue of the fact that their prior rights are
protected only by a liability rule. Through this mechanism, the doctrine avoids many
of the holdout and transaction-cost problems that plague voluntary pooling and
unitization of oil and gas rights.
To illustrate how the fair-opportunity doctrine functions, let us return to our
earlier hypothetical dispute between common owners in the Entrada Sandstone, A
and B.412 A has a permit to flood the common reservoir for CCS, which will interfere
with B’s existing saltwater disposal operations. Rather than apply a reasonableness
standard to resolve these clashing pore space activities, a court applying the fairopportunity doctrine would reason as follows:
• B has an established right to conduct its saltwater disposal operation,
because it was first in time.
• Because B’s activity is prior in time and in right, A may not, without liability,
undertake any affirmative act that would cause a physical invasion of B’s ad
coelum-defined subsurface property and impair either B’s existing disposal
operations or her fair opportunity to conduct like operations in the reservoir.
• Thus, A may not flood the entire reservoir with carbon dioxide, because it
would invade B’s subsurface and preclude B from doing the same, without
offering B (and all other affected owners in the Entrada Sandstone) a fair
opportunity to participate in the CCS operations. In B’s case, to be
considered “fair,” A’s offer to B would need to include compensation for the
lost use value of B’s disposal well (because it was prior in right), as well as
a proportionate share of any income from the CCS operations.413
• If B rejects a fair offer from A and the parties are unable to negotiate an
alternative, A will be entitled to proceed with the CCS operations. B will be
barred from bringing an action against A for any resulting trespass or
nuisance, and accordingly would not be entitled to an injunction.
• If A fails to make a fair offer to participate before conducting the CCS
operations, it will be liable to B (and any other affected reservoir owners)
for damages for impairing existing operations and precluding future ones. B
412
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will be entitled to damages for nuisance under the fair-opportunity doctrine.
If B can prove the necessary elements for an equitable injunction, one may
be available as a remedy, but it is not required by the legal doctrine.414
In sum, if, but only if, A is willing to allow B (and other reservoir owners) to
participate in the CCS project and compensate B for the loss of the saltwater disposal
well, there is nothing to stop A from proceeding with the CCS on that basis. This
result follows from the nature of the relative property interests of A and B as
articulated under the fair-opportunity doctrine.
The fair-opportunity doctrine, as I have articulated it here, may be said to permit
too much exploitation of reservoir pore space. This is ultimately an empirical
question, since the appropriate level of exploitation for any given reservoir cannot
be known precisely except by experience. If it eventually appears necessary to
further limit use of pore space, legislatures may at that time adopt statutory
conservation laws similar to those adopted for oil and gas or non-rechargeable
aquifers.
It may also be argued that the fair-opportunity doctrine could fail to maximize
the value of any given reservoir’s pore space because it does not consider the
purpose or value of an owner’s pore space use. For example, under the doctrine,
assume A uses common pore space to inject produced water for disposal that
migrates beyond the boundaries of A’s surface tract. A’s disposal operation could
prevent other present or future reservoir owners from using pore space under their
land for purposes that may be more valuable, like energy storage. If the net present
value of A’s produced water disposal is less than the net present value of the potential
alternative (e.g., energy storage), then the fair-opportunity doctrine would have
permitted a sub-optimal use of the pore space.
While the problem of maximizing the present value of pore space capacity is
significant, it is not unique to the fair-opportunity doctrine; it could occur under
either a strict-proportional allocation regime, which also does not weigh the utility
or value of any particular pore space use. It could also occur under a utilitarian
reasonable use regime for the simple reason that new pore space uses are still
developing, and the relative value of competing uses in the future is unknowable in
the present. Moreover, the use of pore space for purely malicious purposes would be
actionable because such a waste of shared resources is generally prohibited.415
In sum, defining pore space property on the basis of the fair-opportunity
doctrine may prove more certain and efficient than tests based on reasonable use or
strict proportionality. Additionally, the principles underpinning the doctrine are
already established, in oil and gas law. Employing the doctrine in any particular case
would require merely an extension or novel application of existing principles.
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Therefore, the fair-opportunity doctrine furnishes a ready starting point for analysis
if and when circumstances call on courts to refine property rights in pore space.
VI. CONCLUSION
The extent of rights to use the pore space in subsurface rock formations is a
frontier in property law. In developing a common law of pore space property, it is
important to recognize that its fundamental physical characteristics—
nonexcludability, rivalrousness, and depletability—are similar to other common
pool natural resources such as surface waters, groundwater, and oil and gas
reservoirs. These similarities justify studying the historical and legal development
of water and oil and gas property to derive lessons for governing pore space
semicommons.
In applying these lessons to pore space property, it appears that pore space
rights are currently in an initial absolute stage of development, but may need to
relativize imminently to accommodate increasing demands for pore space capacity.
In limiting pore space rights into relative rights, courts may apply either a utilitarian
reasonable use test or a strict proportional test. Each approach, however, as
demonstrated in the development of water and oil and gas property rights, entails
significant disadvantages.
Alternatively, pore space property rights may be defined by a principle that
owners are entitled to a fair opportunity to use a proportional amount of common
pore space capacity. The fair-opportunity doctrine permits an owner to use shared
pore space for any activity so long as it does not interfere with the lawful existing
operations of other owners, or deprive other owners of a fair opportunity to conduct
the same type of activity from their respective land or to participate in the operation
on equitable terms. Ultimately, the fair-opportunity doctrine may provide a more
certain and administratively efficient means of defining pore space and reservoir
rights in a wide variety of contexts, including injection for waste disposal, carbon
sequestration, secondary and enhanced recovery, hydraulic fracturing, and
horizontal drilling.

